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INTRODUCTION
Most contracts today are bilateral. Contract formation occurs
through an exchange of promises, but what each party desires to ob-
tain is not the other party's promise but the promised performance. If
that performance does not occur, the aggrieved party may seek spe-
cific performance or damages. These remedies do not assure that the
plaintiff will receive the promised performance; court-enforced per-
formance is likely to be untimely and may not be available at all,
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Professeur associ6, Univer-
sity of Jean Moulin (Lyon III) (Fall 1989).
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while damage awards may be too little or too late to provide an ade-
quate substitute. In addition, impossibility or related doctrines may
excuse the defendant's nonperformance. These inadequacies explain
why a party often desires to respond defensively to nonperformance
by preserving the value of its own performance.
Contract law must therefore determine the effect of one party's
nonperformance - normally a breach, but in some cases an excused
breach - on the other party's performance obligations. May the lat-
ter party withhold a performance otherwise due? May it terminate
the contract and obtain the desired counter-performance from some-
one else? May it retrieve from the nonperforming party any perform-
ance it has already rendered? Most likely, the parties will have
neglected to address these three questions in the contract itself.
Therefore, the law of contracts must provide these answers for them.
This article will contrast the French responses to these questions
with the more familiar responses provided by the common law.
Hopefully, the comparison will demonstrate that the study of how a
foreign legal system responds to a particular problem is both interest-
ing in itself and enables us better to appreciate our own system's re-
sponse. Both systems' treatment of nonperformance has evolved over
time, and this article focuses on the significant contributions made by
jurists, both judges and academics, to that historical development.
Part I describes the common law's efforts to identify those
breaches which entitle the aggrieved party to withhold its own per-
formance or to claim a discharge from any further performance obli-
gations. In addition, it will describe the restitutionary relief made
available to that party to retrieve any performance already rendered.
Part II introduces how French law addresses the same questions. The
focus will be on the judicial termination of contracts under article
1184 of the Civil Code of 1804. Part III explores the advantages that
judicial termination offers the aggrieved party. The sweeping restitu-
tionary remedy which may accompany termination is far more gener-
ous than the restitutionary remedies available against a
nonperforming party in common-law systems. Part IV presents the
history behind article 1184 to explain a second striking difference be-
tween its approach and that of the common law. While the common
law recognizes the aggrieved party's self-help remedy of contract ter-
mination, article 1184 imposes on the aggrieved party the burden of
obtaining a discharge from the courts. Part V describes how the
courts have defused this unrealistic requirement by some sensible law-
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making. Such judicial lawmaking, usually disguised as interpretation,
has become an accepted part of the French legal system. Finally, Part
VI seeks to draw some lessons from this comparative study. The prin-
cipal lesson is that the two systems are not as different as one might
initially think. Each system has its own history and its own way of
expressing the applicable rules, but there is a surprising convergence
in the results actually achieved.
I. MATERIAL BREACH, TERMINATION, AND RESTITUTION AT
COMMON LAW
A contracting party confronted by the other party's nonperform-
ance wants to determine if it may safely cease performing, if it may
terminate the contract to obtain a substitute performance elsewhere,
and if it may retrieve any performance it has already rendered. These
three matters are of considerable practical importance. Withholding
performance and terminating the contract are simple self-help reme-
dies; the former may encourage the other party to perform, while the
latter may better protect an aggrieved party's interests than an action
for damages or specific performance. If those self-help remedies are
available, a party may be well-advised to invoke them, especially if
they do not preclude a subsequent suit for damages. Also, the party
may be well-advised to seek restitution of its own performance rather
than to assume the sometimes difficult task of proving the precise
damages (if any) caused by breach.
A. The Contemporary Scene: The United States
Present-day American law addresses the first two of these ques-
tions through the doctrine of constructive conditions of exchange.
Under this approach, the law implies a condition in a bilateral con-
tract which suspends or even discharges a party's duty to perform if
there is an "uncured material failure" by the other party to render a
performance then due.1 This doctrine, now enshrined in section 237
of the Second Restatement of Contracts, stems from a seminal article
by Professor Corbin, in which he described constructive conditions of
1. The quoted phrase comes from section 237 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, which reads in full:
Except as stated in § 240 [on exchanges with agreed equivalents] it is a condition of
each party's remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an ex-
change of promises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party to
render any such performance due at an earlier time.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979).
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exchange as contract terms supplied by the courts to fill a gap in the
parties' agreement or, as Corbin described it, "to determine the jural
relations of the parties as they are now."'2
This recognition, that a bilateral contract contains constructive
conditions of exchange, offers significant protection to an aggrieved
party, who need not lose the value of its own performance when the
counter-performance it bargained for is not forthcoming. However,
this recognition also poses significant risks to a party who invokes the
other party's breach to escape from the contract. All breaches give
rise to a damage action, but not all breaches allow the aggrieved party
to refuse its own performance. A party who believes itself aggrieved
must determine, not only whether the other party has committed a
breach, but also whether that breach is sufficiently serious or material
to allow it to suspend its own performance or to consider itself dis-
charged. A wrong guess on either of these questions may be costly,
since a court may find that the aggrieved party's response was itself a
material breach. Under the theory of constructive conditions, the first
party to commit a material breach is liable for that breach regardless
of any prior nonmaterial breaches of the other party.
3
What constitutes a material breach is often a ticklish question.
Normally, it is safe for an aggrieved party to respond to a breach by
briefly suspending its own performance in order to make inquiries or
seek assurances, 4 but it is often risky for a party to suspend its per-
formance for a protracted period or to terminate the contract, i.e., to
take the position that the breach discharges it from any further duty
to perform. 5
2. Corbin, Conditions in the Law ofContract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 741 (1919). The article
appears as part of a tribute to Professor Hohfeld. On the importance of Corbin's work, see E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.9, at 579 (1982).
Professor Corbin's "now" refers to the time when a party's performance, although due, is
not forthcoming. If the contract requires concurrent performances, or requires the
nonperforming party to perform first, then the other party need not perform, at least if the first
party's failure to perform was material. The failure to perform may be a breach or may be
excused under the doctrine of impossibility or related doctrines. The former situation is more
commonplace; therefore, analysis usually centers on identifying which breaches of contract are
material. For an analysis of the material breach doctrine, see Anderson, A New Look at Mate-
rial Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073 (1988).
3. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.15, at 609 (1982).
4. Rossett, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditions and the Obligation to Communi-
cate, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1083, 1100 (1975).
5. The Uniform Commercial Code uses "termination" to describe a party's putting "an
end to the contract otherwise than for its breach" and "cancellation" to describe a party's
putting "an end to a contract for breach." U.C.C. §§ 2-106(3)-(4) (1987). This article, on the
other hand, uses the word "termination" to cover both kinds of acts by a party. For this use of
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A contractant who believes itself the victim of the other side's
nonperformance often lacks the clear and dispassionate judgment
needed to analyze the merits of its own case. An aggrieved party may
therefore exaggerate the seriousness of a breach and repudiate its own
obligations in a fit of righteous indignation. Take, for example, poor
Herbert Harrison, the irate dry cleaner in the well-known case of
Walker & Co. v. Harrison.6 Harrison, who for a monthly fee had
rented a neon sign to advertise his dry cleaning establishment, became
quite indignant when the sign company refused to maintain the sign
in the manner he believed required by the agreement. After repeated
telephone calls brought no response, Harrison dispatched an angry
telegram repudiating his obligations under the contract. The rental
company thereupon successfully sued Harrison for total breach, re-
covering the entire balance due under the agreement.
That harsh result was a straightforward application of the first
material breach rule. No doubt Harrison's complaints about the lack
of maintenance have a ring of triviality to them - after all, the neon
sign did not go out but only suffered from some rust, cobwebs, and
that famous rotten tomato - but most consumers will agree with the
court's characterization of the rental company's stonewalling as "irri-
tating."' 7 The court nevertheless admonished Harrison that he should
have kept his cool and continued paying the monthly rent. According
to the court:
[t]he injured party's determination that there has been a material
breach, justifying his own repudiation, is fraught with peril, for
should such determination, as viewed by a later court in the calm
of its contemplation, be unwarranted, the repudiator himself will
have been guilty of material breach and himself have become the
aggressor, not an innocent victim. 8
The Second Restatement of Contracts offers little assistance to an
aggrieved party, such as Herbert Harrison, forced to decide whether
to maintain or repudiate a contract. Sections 241 and 242, which
closely parallel sections 275 and 276 of the First Restatement, adopt
Professor Williston's fairness approach for identifying material
the word "termination," see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.15, at 606 n.2 (1982). On the
penalties for guessing wrong, see K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 223 Md. 305, 164 A.2d 451
(1960) (subcontractor's walking off job a material breach not justified by contractor's suspen-
sion of progress payments following subcontractor's earlier breach).
6. 347 Mich. 630, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957).
7. Id. at 636, 81 N.W.2d at 356.
8. Id. at 635, 81 N.W.2d at 355.
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breaches.9 Williston recognized that the materiality issue normally
arose in suits brought by a party in breach - the sign company, for
example - claiming that the other party's defensive refusal to per-
form was itself a breach of contract. Therefore, the question for the
courts was the materiality of the plaintiff's breach. According to Wil-
liston, the answer depended on whether
it is fairer to ailow the piaintiff to recover [on the contract], requir-
ing the defendant to bring a cross action or counter claim for such
breach of contract as the plaintiff may have committed, or whether
it is fairer to deny the plaintiff a right of recovery on account of his
breach, even at the expense of compelling him to forfeit any com-
pensation for such part performance as he has rendered.' 0
Quite naturally, that fairness approach did not result in firm rules but
in a list of relevant circumstances to consider which take into account
the interests of the wrongdoer as well as those of the aggrieved party.
Such balancing of interests may be feasible when done by a judge after
the fact, but it is difficult for a party to accomplish at the time of
breach. The task was surely beyond the competence of Herbert
Harrison.
Faithful to Williston's approach, section 241 of the Second Re-
statement identifies five "circumstances" as "significant" in determin-
ing whether a failure to render performance is "material."" Those
circumstances focus on the effect of nonperformance on both the ag-
grieved party (To what extent will he lose the benefit expected? Will
damages adequately compensate him? Is cure likely?) and the party
in breach (Will he suffer forfeiture? Did his conduct conform to stan-
dards of good faith and fair dealing?). Applying these circumstances,
9. Anderson, supra note 2, at 1082-83.
10. 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 841, at 2360 (1936).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979). The full text reads as
follows:
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material,
the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he
reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the
part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable
assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
[Vol. 12:139
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in addition to whatever other factors it wishes to consider, a court
must evaluate after the fact whether any nonperformance by the ag-
grieved party was proper or itself constituted a material breach.
Section 242 then introduces two additional "significant circum-
stances" to consider if the aggrieved party does not merely suspend
performance but, like Herbert Harrison, claims a discharge from any
further duty to perform.12 Once again courts must weigh all the cir-
cumstances after the fact to pass judgment on the aggrieved party's
response. Plainly, the Second Restatement envisions a two-step pro-
cess for most cases, with a party first suspending performance and
then terminating the contract.' 3 How long an aggrieved party must
wait before terminating depends on the need to act promptly to make
substitute arrangements and the extent to which the agreement re-
quires timely performance.' 4
Surprisingly, sections 241 and 242 do not even tell the aggrieved
party to what extent a court will scrutinize more closely the alleged
breach if the party invokes it to terminate the contract rather than
merely to suspend performance. There is no indication in the text or
commentary whether the breach must be a more serious one for the
aggrieved party to terminate the contract and thus treat itself as dis-
charged. It appears to be only a question of how long the party must
wait, which in turn depends on how promptly it must act to make
reasonable substitute arrangements and what the agreement itself pro-
vides for when delayed performance becomes the equivalent of no per-
formance at all. It is even possible that discharge may follow
immediately upon a material breach if the parties had agreed that late
12. Id. at § 242. The full text reads as follows:
In determining the time after which a party's uncured material failure to render or to
offer performance discharges the other party's remaining duties to render perform-
ance under the rules stated in §§ 237 and 238, the following circumstances are signifi-
cant:
(a) those stated in § 241;
(b) the extent to which it reasonably appears to the injured party that delay may
prevent or hinder him in making reasonable substitute arrangements;
(c) the extent to which the agreement provides for performance without delay,
but a material failure to perform or to offer to perform on a stated day does not of
itself discharge the other party's remaining duties unless the circumstances, including
the language of the agreement, indicate that performance or an offer to perform by
that day is important.
Id.
13. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.15, at 606-07 (1982).
14. These are the two additional circumstances mentioned in section 242. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (1979).
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performance was not acceptable.' 5
These Restatement texts do no more than give courts a frame-
work for deciding cases by providing formulas or phrases that judges
can grab hold of and purport to apply. They do not give any practical
guidance to contractants on how to respond to a breach, and surely
their drafters never intended them to do so. At most, sections 241
and 242Al wam, a contractant that I breachA ustMI bevr eros r
must seriously disrupt the contractant's affairs, if it wishes to invoke
the breach as a basis for refusing its own performance. Perhaps the
strongest message communicated by the Restatement is to avoid pre-
cipitous action since a party acts at its peril. The sections thus reflect
the courts' preference for upholding contracts and for avoiding forfei-
ture, if they can do so without seriously disappointing justified
expectations. 16
Sections 241 and 242 appear to adopt, as does much of Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code, Karl Llewellyn's philosophy of
"immanent law," under which the applicable text, be it a statute or
Restatement, does not state what the law is but tells the judges how to
find it.17 They are to find it, not in doctrinal formulations or through
policy analysis, but in the fact-patterns of everyday life. This reliance
on the judges' situation-sense for deciding cases reappears in the Uni-
form Commercial Code itself, which makes no attempt whatsoever to
define "substantial impairment of a contract's value," the Code's
equivalent of the Restatement's concept of material breach. '8 Plainly,
such a formulation does not provide contractants with rules regarding
when they may terminate for breach; they must seek guidance, not in
the legal text, but in the way their fellow human beings conduct their
affairs. That inquiry is also necessary under the Restatement, despite
the effort to mask it through a lengthy list of relevant circumstances.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242(c) (1979) and E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 8.18, at 617-18 (1982).
16. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.15, at 607 (1982). Professor Anderson has sug-
gested reformulating the material breach doctrine to recognize the role it should play in pro-
tecting the aggrieved party's interest in future performance. His approach treats a breach as
material only if it sufficiently impairs the victim's interest in future performance to warrant a
reasonable belief that termination is justified. Anderson, supra note 2, at 1107. That reformu-
lation has the advantage of focusing on what Anderson believes to be the most significant
factor in the materiality analysis.
17. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 621, 626-27 (1975); Gedid, U C. C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 359-71 (1988).
18. See U.C.C. §§ 2-608(a) and 2-612(3) (1987) as discussed in I J. WHITE AND R. SUM-
MERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8.3 (3d ed. 1988).
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Professor Corbin, who played no small role in its drafting, insisted
that there was no other way to approach the materiality inquiry. For
Corbin, whether a breach was material was "a question of degree; and
it must be answered by weighing the consequences in the light of the
actual custom of men in the performance of contracts similar to the
one that is involved in the specific case."' 19
Present-day American law has less difficulty identifying the rem-
edies available to the victim of a material breach than it does in identi-
fying material breaches, but those remedies include only limited
opportunities to retrieve a performance already rendered. A material
breach, at least when the delay in performance also becomes material
under section 242, discharges the aggrieved party's duty to perform.
That party, therefore, has the option of treating the contract as termi-
nated and immediately suing for damages for total breach, i.e., for
damages based on all of the injured party's remaining rights to per-
formance.20 Alternatively, the aggrieved party may seek "restitution
for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part
performance or reliance. ' 21 Restitution offers a party who has per-
formed the advantage of retrieving the value of its performance even
in cases where expectancy damages are unavailable because they are
too speculative or because the contract was a losing one. Restitution-
ary relief may also include, in appropriate cases, specific restitution of
any benefit conferred on the party in breach.22
The Second Restatement makes no mention of rescission as a
contract remedy, and the Uniform Commercial Code expressly dis-
avows it.23 Indeed, Professor Corbin challenged the very existence of
rescission as a remedy for breach. According to Corbin, rescission
occurs only when the parties agree to terminate their contractual rela-
tions prospectively. 24 The parties' rescission of their contract may or
19. 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946, at 809 (1951).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 236(1) and 243(1) (1979). The ag-
grieved party may also opt to treat the breach as partial and thus keep the contract in force.
Id. § 236(2). See also E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.15, at 608 (1982).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(1) (1979).
22. Id. § 372(1). These remedies described above are potentially cumulative, and the Sec-
ond Restatement only precludes a party from pursuing inconsistent remedies. Thus, an injured
party cannot seek both restitution and either damages for total breach or specific performance,
but may obtain both restitution and damages for any costs incurred in undoing the transaction.
Id. § 378 comment d.
23. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 1 (1987) (substituting concept of buyer's revocation of
acceptance).
24. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1236, at 533-34 (1964).
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may not include an accord and satisfaction settling all claims for
breach. Rescission thus requires mutual assent but no action by a
court. If the parties do not agree to rescind, there is no basis for a
court to do so because what discharges a party from its contractual
duties is the other party's material breach and not the court's order.
The aggrieved party, if it opts to terminate the contract, may then
Seek, restittin fr-m th, hr nhing partv, but to describe that process
as "rescission and restitution" is to add an unnecessary step. 25
Professor Dobbs, the leading contemporary authority on reme-
dies, agrees with Corbin only in part. In most cases, Dobbs acknowl-
edges that the injured party can obtain restitution without any judicial
rescission of the contract. However, Dobbs insists that there are cases
in which the courts cannot award restitution without first undoing a
completed transaction. 26 In those cases, for a plaintiff to recover a
performance already rendered, a court must either order the defend-
ant to reconvey property, or must itself cancel the relevant documents
to undo the transaction. 27 To Professor Dobbs, the word "rescission"
appropriately describes the courts' actions in those cases.
28
This modem restitutionary remedy for breach is subject to a
number of limitations which make it a less generous remedy than that
available under French law. First, restitution is not available to an
aggrieved party who has fully performed if the only performance still
due from the party in breach is the payment of a definite sum of
money.29 Thus, a seller cannot seek restitution for goods delivered to
the buyer if the buyer does not pay the agreed price. Second, the
availability of specific restitution in equity has traditionally turned on
the familiar criteria of the uniqueness of the thing transferred and the
inadequacy of the damages remedy. 30 Third, even if the plaintiff satis-
25. Id. § 1105, at 571.
26. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 254-56 (1973).
27. Equity courts have traditionally exercised in personam powers which allow them to
order defendants to do what ought to be done. In addition, modem court rules generally
confer on courts exercising equity powers the authority to cancel documents or to give legal
effect to documents drafted in the defendant's name. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 70.
28. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 256 (1973). See also I
G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 4.6 (1978).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1979).
30. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 354 (1932). Section 372(l)(a) of the Sec-
ond Restatement only authorizes a court, in its discretion, to withhold the remedy of specific
restitution if granting it would "unduly interfere with the certainty of title to land or otherwise
cause injustice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372(l)(a) (1979). It is unclear if
any change was intended. Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COL.
L. REV. 37, 47 (1981).
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fies these criteria, specific restitution is normally awarded in cases
where the plaintiff avoids the contract, and not in cases involving ma-
terial breach.
3'
The explanation for this last limitation is not entirely clear. Pro-
fessor Dobbs suggests that a party must establish some property inter-
est, either legal or equitable, in the benefit conferred to obtain specific
restitution. 32 That requirement poses no problem when a party avoids
a contract for duress, mistake or fraud. Those defects vitiate the con-
tract's very formation and give the injured party at least an equitable
claim to any property conveyed. Termination for breach, on the other
hand, discharges all remaining performance duties but does not affect
any performance that has already occurred. This distinction rightly
encourages courts to avoid sowing disruption by unscrambling trans-
fers of property that occurred prior to termination. 33
Finally, the Uniform Commercial Code, consistent with prior
sales law, sharply limits restitutionary remedies for breach. An un-
paid seller cannot reclaim goods delivered to a buyer that becomes
insolvent unless the insolvency occurs within ten days of receipt of the
goods. 34 In all other cases, the seller receives the same treatment as
the buyer's other unsecured creditors. 35 Likewise, the buyer cannot
return nonconforming goods and retrieve the price paid unless it satis-
fies quite demanding requirements for revoking its acceptance of the
goods. 3 6 In the case of installment sales, similar requirements limit
the buyer's right even to reject nonconforming goods. 37 These provi-
sions limit the buyer's ability to divert any losses caused by an unprof-
itable deal back onto the seller. The buyer must perform and be
content with its damages remedy.
B. A Look Backward: England
When compared to American law, English law has encountered
far more difficulty in answering the basic questions of when a con-
tractant, confronted with the other party's nonperformance, may
31. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.19, at 907-08 (1982).
32. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 255-56 (1973).
33. The reported cases granting specific restitution following breach involve sellers re-
trieving land exchanged for other land or in return for promised lifetime care. See, e.g., the
cases cited by E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.19, at 907 n.26 (1982).
34. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1987). The ten day limitation does not apply if the buyer misrep-
resented its solvency to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery.
35. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SALES § 165, at 499-500 (1970).
36. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1987).
37. Id. § 2-612.
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either withhold its own performance, terminate the contract, or seek
restitution. Perhaps the fact that the lawmakers in England (primar-
ily the judges) had to perform first explains this phenomenon. Eng-
lish judges had developed the basic rules resolving these questions by
1804, the year the French decided to codify their own law of contract.
The American law of contract developed later and often profited from
the earlier English experience. Even Williston, a conservative thinker,
frequently criticized the formalism of English law and the reluctance
of English judges to develop more flexible rules. 38 American jurists'
willingness to learn from past mistakes has contributed to more rapid
changes in the law. The American law of contract has experienced
not only a Williston, but also a Corbin, two Restatements, and a Uni-
form Commercial Code; the legal landscape has been greatly altered
as a result. English contract law, on the other hand, shares with
French law a greater continuity with the past. Neither body of law
has experienced modernizing windstorms comparable to those that
have swept the American legal scene; both still rely on legal rules first
formulated in cases (England) or statutes (France) roughly two centu-
ries ago. This similarity may make English law more suitable for
comparative purposes when studying French law on the discharge of
contractual duties.
English law has traditionally addressed the questions of when a
contractant may suspend its performance or claim a discharge under
the rubric of who may sue for breach of contract. Such issues arose
when a party, who had not fully performed, sued a defendant who
had responded to that nonperformance by invoking the self-help rem-
edy of refusing its own performance. Thus, the question before the
court was whether the plaintiff could sue for breach of contract de-
spite its own nonperformance.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the common law
responded to that question with at least a presumptive "yes." ' 39 The
issue had not arisen prior to that time on account of the narrow hori-
zons of the common law of contracts. Contractual liability was either
38. See infra notes 67 and 76.
39. This account largely follows S. STOIUAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON
LAW 148 (1975) [hereinafter STOUJAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT] and Stoljar, Dependent
and Independent Promises: A Study in the History of Contract, 2 SYDNEY L. REV. 217 (1957)
[hereinafter Stoljar, Dependent and Independent Promises]. For a different view, arguing that
the common law did not change much over time but retained a steady mix of dependent and
independent promises, see McGovern, Dependent Promises in the History of Leases and Other
Contracts, 52 TUL. L. REV. 659 (1978).
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formal, based on a sealed covenant executed by the defendant, or real,
based on some res or thing already transferred from the plaintiff to the
defendant. In the latter case, the plaintiff had already fully performed
when it sought to hold the defendant liable in debt or detinue for not
performing. The plaintiff's nonperformance became an issue when
the courts, beginning at the end of the fifteenth century, recognized
the bilateral contract (a promised exchanged for a promise). Could
the plaintiff, who had promised but failed to perform, enforce the de-
fendant's promise? The courts' initial response was "yes," on the
grounds that the two promises were independent. The defendant,
sued by a plaintiff who had not performed, still had the plaintiff's
promise and could bring a separate action to enforce it. Since the
plaintiff still had to perform, there was no justification for the defend-
ant withholding performance. 4°
The common law's original response, to whether a party who
had not performed could enforce a bilateral contract, did not prove
lasting. By the end of the eighteenth century, the presumptive "yes"
given by the courts had become a presumptive "no." The courts soon
recognized, more realistically, that a party to a bilateral contract bar-
gained, not just for a promise, but for the promised performance. A
lawsuit to enforce that promise was not an adequate substitute for the
performance itself. That reality led Lord Mansfield, in the famous
case of Kingston v. Preston,41 to treat the defendant's promise as de-
pendent on the plaintiff's performance, thus allowing the defendant to
withhold his own performance in response to the plaintiff's breach.
That decision has been hailed by leading scholars as a revolutionary
innovation "contrary to what had been held for law from time imme-
morial, ' 42 and announced "in spite of three centuries of opposing
precedents. '43 However, as will be shown, the Kingston decision was
40. See STOLAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT, supra note 39, at 149; P. ATIYAH, THE
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 208 (1979); Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the
History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (1979). This initial position in favor of
independent promises resembled the common law's earlier approach to mutual covenants,
which the courts generally treated as independent unless the parties clearly indicated a con-
trary intent through the use of a verbal formula indicative of an express condition. For a fuller
discussion, see Stoljar, Dependent and Independent Promises, supra note 39, at 219-23.
41. Lofft 194, 98 Eng. Rep. 606 (K.B. 1773). A report of the case also appears as part of
the argument of counsel in Jones v. Barkley, 2 Dougl. 684, 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 434, 437 (K.B.
1781). Subsequent citations to Kingston have normally referred to that report.
42. C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 184 (1880).
43. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, § 817, at 2299 (1936). This notion that Kingston v.
Preston was the "first strong authority" on dependent promises originated with Justices Grose
and Le Blanc in Glazebrook v. Woodrow, 8 T.R. 366, 101 Eng. Rep. 1436 (K.B. 1799).
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not quite as novel as Lord Mansfield's reputation as an innovator has
led some to believe.
The facts of Kingston v. Preston amply demonstrate the harshness
of the common law's initial approach of independency. In Kingston,
an apprentice and his master agreed that the apprentice would serve
for one year and then the master would convey the business to him.
The apprentice promised that he would provide the master with good
and sufficient security for the agreed price. After failing to provide
that security, the apprentice nevertheless sued the master to enforce
the latter's promise to convey. The master's counsel" argued that it
was highly unreasonable for the court to interpret the agreement so as
to oblige the master to perform by surrendering a valuable business
and to rely on the apprentice's personal assets, which both parties
admitted to be worth nothing. That unfortunate result struck Lord
Mansfield as "the greatest injustice;" he avoided it by interpreting the
apprentice's giving such security as a "condition precedent" to the
master's promise.45 The master's promise was thus dependent on the
satisfaction of the condition, which allowed the master to withhold
his performance if the apprentice had not procured the promised se-
curity. That result, according to Lord Mansfield, reflected "the evi-
dent sense and meaning of the parties."'46  He thus invoked the
parties' intent (albeit that intent was not as clearly expressed as it
might have been) as the basis for determining that a promise was de-
pendent on the other party's performance.
Kingston certainly does not read like an innovative decision; the
court merely interpreted the agreement to find the intent of the par-
ties.47 Indeed, it seems more accurate to characterize the decision as
giving "shape and consistency" 48 to the law rather than revolution-
izing it. Long before Kingston, the common law had responded to the
44. The future Justice Grose. Glazebrook, 8 T.R. at 371-72, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1439-40.
45. Jones, 2 Dougl. at 691, 99 Eng. Rep. at 438.
46. Id.
47. In the course of his opinion Lord Mansfield did describe "three kinds of covenants:"
independent, dependent, and concurrent (i.e., "mutual conditions to be performed at the same
time"). The discussion of concurrent or mutually dependent covenants was dictum because
Lord Mansfield plainly found the apprentice's performance to be a condition precedent which
the apprentice had to satisfy before the master's duty to perform arose. Professor Stolijar be-
lieves the dictum to be the most significant aspect of the opinion. Its recognition of concurrent
conditions prepared the way for a new body of rules on cooperation in the mutual completion
of an exchange. STOLJAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT, supra note 39, at 155-59.
48. Professor Street so described the decision in 2 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILITY 137 (1906).
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inconvenience of treating promises as independent. During the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries the courts had developed an elaborate
set of rules for determining whether a plaintiff had to show perform-
ance, or only a counter-promise and consideration, before it could sue
on a bilateral contract. The answer depended on what the parties in-
tended since it was undisputed that a party could make its own obli-
gations conditional on another's performance. 49  Those rules
purported to be merely interpretive ones for ascertaining the intent of
the parties. Their effect, according to a leading legal historian, was to
make it "most unusual for a plaintiff to be able to sue for breach with-
out showing performance or tender." 50
The older common-law rules, in fact, survived Kingston when the
much-maligned Sergeant Williams, in a case note in his 1798 edition
of Saunders' Reports, restated what he believed to be the rules gov-
erning the dependency or independency of mutual promises. 51
Although confusing and difficult to apply, these rules for ascertaining
the parties' intent had more impact on the common law's develop-
ment than Lord Mansfield's opinion in Kingston which was really no
more than one application of them. In the United States, Professor
Corbin made both Sergeant Williams' rules and Kingston largely irrel-
evant when he replaced implications of dependency with constructive
conditions of exchange supplied by the courts to fill gaps in the agree-
ment. English law, on the other hand, still seeks to ascertain the par-
ties' intent concerning whether the plaintiff must perform, or at least
tender performance, in order to sue on the defendant's promise. Over
the centuries the law has evolved from treating mutual promises as
independent, if no contrary evidence appears (the original sixteenth-
century response to the law's recognition of a promise for a promise),
to the current approach of treating them as dependent unless there is
contrary evidence. 52 The Kingston decision is little more than the
most visible step in that long transition.
Four years after deciding Kingston, Lord Mansfield made a sec-
ond, and perhaps more original, contribution to the law of contract.
In the famous case of Boone v. Eyre,53 the seller sued for the price on
an executed sale of a West Indian plantation together with its stock of
slaves. The buyer had refused to pay the remainder of the price due
49. A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 452 (1975).
50. Simpson, supra note 40, at 544 n.58.
51. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, §§ 819-823.
52. H. BEALE, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 27 (1980).
53. 1 H. BI. 273, 126 Eng. Rep. 160(a) (K.B. 1777).
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on the grounds that the seller did not lawfully possess some of the
slaves. That defense did not appeal to Lord Mansfield, who had no
difficulty concluding that the seller could sue for the full price, subject
to the buyer's right to collect damages for any deficiency in the seller's
performance. Since the seller's breach went "only to a part" of the
"consideration," it "ought to be paid for in damages" rather than
Pleaded as a "condition. , "M, The bMuyer therefore, could int
refuse its own performance on account of the seller's breach.
Boone thus recognizes that while every breach gives rise to an
action for damages, not every breach allows the innocent party to
withhold its own performance. Lord Mansfield's brief opinion, how-
ever, provides little guidance for distinguishing between the two types
of breaches. His reference to the seller's breach affecting only "part"
of the consideration seemingly encouraged courts to distinguish be-
tween types of breaches based on their effect on the innocent party,
but for nearly two centuries English law generally took a quite differ-
ent approach. The courts did not consider so much the effect of the
breach as they did the intent of the parties at the time of contract
formation. 55 Did the parties intend the contractual provision
breached by the plaintiff to be a condition or a warranty? If they
intended it to be a condition, the plaintiff's nonperformance justified
the defendant's refusal to perform its own promise. If they intended it
to be a warranty, the plaintiff was liable in damages for its breach but
still could sue on the contract.
56
This classificatory approach appears in such famous nineteenth-
century cases as Bettini v. Gye,57 where the court held that the plaintiff
opera singer's attendance at rehearsals was not a condition precedent,
the nonperformance of which did not justify the defendant's refusal to
accept her services for the remainder of the engagement, and Ellen v.
Topp, 58 where the court held that a master's teaching an apprentice
the three trades in which he was engaged was a condition precedent to
the apprentice's duty to serve. In both cases, the party who brought
suit was the party who had committed the first breach, and the plain-
tiff's success depended on the court's finding that the parties did not
54. Id.
55. Devlin, The Treatment of Breach of Contract, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 192 (1966); H.
BEALE, supra note 52, at 39-49; M. FURMSTON, CHESIRE, FIFOOT, AND FURMSTON'S LAW OF
CONTRACT 140-49 (11th ed. 1986).
56. Devlin, supra note 55, at 196, 202-03.
57. 1 Q.B.D. 183 (1876).
58. 6 Ex. 424, 155 Eng. Rep. 609 (1851).
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intend the contractual provision breached to be a condition prece-
dent. 59 Only in the 1960s, in the aftermath of the path-breaking opin-
ions of Justices Upjohn and Diplock in the Hong Kong Fir case, ° did
the English courts forthrightly analyze the effect of a breach to deter-
mine whether it was sufficiently material to allow the innocent party
to refuse its own performance. English scholars, on the whole, have
welcomed this new, more flexible approach, while recognizing that it
sacrifices some certainty to achieve greater fairness.6'
Both Kingston and Boone involved suits by parties who had with-
held their own performance because the other party had not per-
formed fully. Therefore, the decisions directly addressed only the first
of the questions which interest us (when may an aggrieved party with-
hold its own performance?) and not the follow-up questions of when
an aggrieved party may claim a discharge from ever performing and
when an aggrieved party may retrieve a performance already ren-
dered. The former question has never attracted much attention in
England; its resolution seemingly depends on whether the time which
the contract allows for performance has expired.62 The latter ques-
tion received a more formalistic answer than Lord Mansfield believed
appropriate. In Towers v. Barrett,63 the plaintiff sued to recover ten
guineas he had paid for a "one horse chaise and harness." The agree-
ment allowed the plaintiff to return the chaise if his wife did not like
it. The plaintiff's wife disapproved of the chaise, causing the plaintiff
to return it and tender the agreed per diem charge. Nevertheless, the
defendant kept the ten guineas and the plaintiff sued for return of the
money. The plaintiff's action for money had and received provoked a
warm response from Lord Mansfield, who proclaimed himself a
"great friend" of the action, which he believed to be "very beneficial"
and "founded on principles of eternal justice." 64 To Lord Mansfield,
the case was an easy one: "The defendant has got his chaise again,
59. In applying the condition vs. warranty distinction, the Bettini court focused more on
the importance of the term (did the attendance at rehearsals go to the "root of the matter"?)
than on the actual intent of the parties. 1 Q.B.D. at 188 (Blackburn, J.). The court also
suggested that the defendant could seek damages even though the singer's nonattendance re-
sulted from illness. Id. at 187.
60. Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 2 Q.B. 26 (1962).
61. H. BEALE, supra note 52, at 98; Treitel, Some Problems of Breach of Contract, 30
MOD. L. REV. 139 (1967).
62. H. BEALE, supra note 52, at 82-84. Once the court finds a material breach there is no
separate inquiry, as under section 242 of the Second Restatement, on the materiality of the
delay in performing.
63. 1 T.R. 133, 99 Eng. Rep. 1014 (K.B. 1786).
64. Id. at 134, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1015.
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and, not withstanding that, he keeps the money. '65
To Justice Buller and the other Justices sitting in Towers, 66 the
case was a bit more complicated. Justice Buller reasoned that the ac-
tion for money had and received - a restitutionary action in modem
terminology - was available to the plaintiff to recover his money
only if the original contract had been "rescinded." Rescission, ac-
cording io Jus i e Duller, could occur in cither of +.w-, wvays: first, as in
the present case, rescission occurs under "the original terms of the
contract"; second, rescission could follow "a subsequent assent" of
the parties. In the former case, it is the operation of a condition found
in the original contract that rescinds the contract. For example, it
was the wife's disapproval of the chaise which relieved the buyer's
obligation to pay for it. In the latter case, it is the subsequent agree-
ment of the parties which rescinds the contract; the parties rescind
when the aggrieved party accepts the other party's repudiation of the
contract.
Justice Buller's formalistic views on rescinding contracts have
largely prevailed in English law, at least until recent times. Rescission
is a consensual process requiring mutual assent, either at the time of
contract formation through the inclusion of condition or in a subse-
quent agreement to rescind. Unilateral rescission is not possible. 67 As
recently as 1979, the House of Lords described the process of a party's
putting an end to a contract in terms of the party's "accepting" the
other party's "repudiation. ' 68 That opinion nevertheless attracted
favorable comment because it made clear that what English judges
have traditionally called "rescission" was not really a rescission at all,
or at least not a "rescission ab initio." Rather, it was more like a
"termination," i.e., the discharge of the parties' remaining perform-
ance obligations, but not the retroactive destruction of the original
65. Id.
66. The two other Justices sitting (Willes and Ashhurst) expressed views similar to those
of Justice Buller. Id.
67. Professor Williston sharply criticized, as erroneous in principle and unfortunate in
practice, this rigid consensual approach to rescission. Williston, Repudiation of Contracts, 14
HARV. L. REV. 317, 421 (1901). That criticism, which first appeared in a law review article
published early in his career, remained substantially unchanged in the 1936 edition of his
contracts treatise, even though he did note some change in English law. See 3 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 10, § 1467, at 4103, 4104 n.4. Professor Woodson of Stanford also condemned the
English law on rescission. F. WOODSON, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS 429 (1913).
68. Johnson v. Agnew, [1980] App. Cas. 367, 392 (H.L. 1979) (opinion of Lord
Wilberforce).
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contract. 69 This equation of rescission with termination does not af-
fect English law's preference for treating the process as consensual
rather than as an aggrieved party's exercise of an option given it by
the law.
The availability of restitutionary relief in England has suffered
from the common law's insistence on rescission as a prerequisite.70
Only after the original contract has been avoided by rescission may a
party who has paid money under it obtain restitution for money had
and received. 71 This dichotomy between contractual and quasi-con-
tractual recoveries led the English common law to take the extreme
position that a plaintiff could recover in quasi-contract for money had
and received only upon a total failure of consideration. 72 Thus, a
quasi-contractual recovery was unavailable if the plaintiff obtained
any benefit from the defendant's performance, although the plaintiff
might avoid this limitation if somehow he were able to return every-
thing received. In the leading case of Hunt v. Silk, 73 the plaintiff was
unable to return everything because he had enjoyed the defendant's
premises for at least ten days before he sought to rescind an agree-
ment to lease them. Therefore, he was unable to retrieve what he had
paid after the defendant failed to execute the promised lease. Lord
Ellenborough held that the plaintiff could not recover in quasi-con-
tract because "where a contract is to be rescinded at all, it must be
rescinded in total, and the parties put in status quo."' 74 This require-
ment has prompted much criticism in England 75 and never became
part of American law. 76 English law still treats quasi-contractual and
69. H. BEALE, supra note 52, at 105, 108; Shea, Discharge from Performance of Contracts
by Failure of Condition, 42 MOD. L. REV. 623, 640-42 (1979); M. FURMSTON, supra note 55,
at 530-33.
70. R. GOFF & G. JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 31 n.85 (3d ed. 1986). The au-
thors cite as authority Weston v. Downes, 1 Doug. 23, 99 Eng. Rep. 19 (K.B. 1778) (the
precedent distinguished by Justice Buller in Towers), and Justice Buller's subsequent opinion in
Toussaint v. Martinnant, 2 T.R. 100, 105, 100 Eng. Rep. 55, 57 (K.B. 1787). In Towers, the
court held that the buyer could rescind the sale and obtain restitution upon the failure of the
condition precedent. 1 T.R. 133, 136, 99 Eng. Rep. 1014, 1016 (K.B. 1786).
71. The same limitation applies in actions for services rendered (quantum meruit) and
goods delivered (quantum valebat).
72. R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 70, at 44-47; G. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH
OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 386-88 (1988).
73. 5 East 449, 102 Eng. Rep. 1142 (K.B. 1804).
74. Id. at 450-52, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1143-44.
75. R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 70, at 371, 460-61; P. BIRKs, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 259-64 (1985).
76. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 10, § 1460, at 4080. The more liberal American rule
would have allowed the plaintiff to recover the money paid if it tendered the defendant a
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contractual remedies as distinct and mutually exclusive,77 while in the
United States restitution has become another remedy for breach of
contract. 78
The Towers and Hunt decisions should prompt considerable
skepticism concerning the importance of quasi-contractual remedies
in English law. Professor Atiyah, one of the strongest advocates of
beI I-used recoveries, has defn de l d tle "apparent doinltanice" of
quasi-contract in eighteenth-century England.79  According to
Atiyah, contracting parties rarely sued to enforce an expectancy inter-
est. Most lawsuits involved partially performed contracts and plain-
tiffs who were concerned about losing the benefit of their
performance. Professors Simpson80 and Dawson 8t are more skeptical
and describe the quasi-contractual remedy for money had and re-
ceived as an alternative, fall-back remedy accompanying a contractual
claim. Modern English authorities emphasize that the action for
money had and received was popular due to its simplicity and conven-
ience.8 2 The plaintiff had the advantage of suing for a liquidated sum
and did not need to prove damages. Any dominance of quasi-contract
in the eighteenth century is most likely attributable to those factors.
While it may have been popular, its scope was certainly limited. The
relief granted was a money judgment, almost always for money had
and received. The other quasi-contractual or common count remedies
for services rendered or goods sold and delivered never quite devel-
oped in England.83 In particular, the unpaid seller could not even
obtain restitution for the value of goods delivered to the buyer.
8 4
reasonable daily rental for the use of the premises. Williston naturally preferred the American
approach to the "severity" and "rigor" of the rule in Hunt v. Silk. Id. § 1454A, at 4062 n.3,
and § 1460, at 4080.
77. The House of Lords has modified the Hunt rule to require, as a prerequisite for resti-
tution, only the prospective termination and not the retroactive annihilation of the original
contract; but this modification has not affected the separate requirement that the plaintiff seek-
ing restitution establish a total failure of consideration. See R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note
70, at 45, 459 (discussing Johnson v. Agnew, [1980] App. Cas. 367 (H.L. 1979)).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1979) (listing remedies for breach
of contract).
79. P. ATIYAH, supra note 40, at 184. The nineteenth century supposedly saw a decline
of quasi-contract and an increase of suits to enforce purely executory contracts. Id. at 455-57.
80. Simpson, supra note 40, at 587-88.
81. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 175-76 (1959).
82. H. BEALE, supra note 52, at 204. See also Dawson, supra note 81, at 175.
83. P. BIRKS, supra note 75, at 229 ("the plaintiff who has conferred a non-money benefit
will not often be able to obtain restitution").
84. The American rule is no more favorable to the unpaid seller's restitutionary interest
despite the contrary wishes of Professors Keener and Woodward. See I G. PALMER, supra
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English sales law further reflects the poverty of common-law
restitutionary remedies and, as will be seen, provides a striking con-
trast with the broad restitutionary remedy provided by French law.
One of the major areas of conflict in the nineteenth-century English
law of sales was the unpaid seller's right to resell goods. 85 The prob-
lem arose because in most credit sales the property interest in the
goods passed to the buyer before the goods did. If the goods were the
buyer's property, how could the seller sell them to somebody else? Of
course, the unpaid seller had a lien on the goods while they were in its
possession and could stop them in transit, but those remedies only
protected the seller's interest in the price. To resell the goods, the
seller had to have title. Revesting the property in the seller required
an agreement, which could occur only if the buyer's nonpayment was
a repudiation of the original contract which the seller then accepted.
If the buyer did not repudiate, the seller had to hold the goods for the
buyer and sue for the price.86
The conservatism of the English judges, their reluctance to
change established rules, and their formalistic insistence on rescission
by mutual consent before the seller could resell, were all sharply criti-
cized by Professor Williston, who praised American courts for not
hesitating to formulate rules that better served mercantile convey-
ance. 87 Of course, from the perspective of the unpaid seller under
French law, the differences between nineteenth-century English and
American law were trifling. The only issue considered under English
and American law was the seller's power to resell goods that had not
yet reached the buyer (i.e., goods which the seller still possessed or
had stopped in transit). In neither system did the unpaid seller have a
goods-oriented remedy once the buyer took delivery. As one English
court noted, there was no "case to be found in the Books" which
allowed the unpaid seller to reclaim goods delivered to the buyer. 88
American law has not been any more generous in providing the un-
note 28, § 4.3, at 379, citing W. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS
301 (1893) and F. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS § 262 (1913).
85. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject, see 5 J. BENJAMIN, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY pt. 1, at ch. 5 (5th ed. 1906).
86. It was not until 1893 that section 48(2) of the English Sale of Goods Act (still in
force) finally recognized the seller's right to resell upon giving notice to the buyer. Sale of
Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. 365, ch. 71, § 48(2).
87. 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW CONCERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND
UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 544, at 166, and § 555, at 185-86 (1948).
88. Page v. Cowasjee Eduljee, 1 L.R. 127, 145 (P.C. 1866).
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paid seller a restitutionary remedy. 89
II. THE EFFECT OF NONPERFORMANCE IN CONTEMPORARY
FRENCH LAW
Compared to the common law, contemporary French law takes a
dramatically different approach to the effect of nonperformance (nor-
mally due to breach) on the aggrieved party's duties and remedies
under a bilateral contract. Under French law, one party's nonper-
formance may suspend, but does not discharge, the other party's duty
to perform; discharge occurs only when a court terminates the origi-
nal contract. Following termination, the aggrieved party may retrieve
any performance already rendered by it, or the value thereof. Thus,
termination is neither a unilateral nor a consensual process but a judi-
cial one. Judicial termination offers the victim of nonperformance a
convenient restitutionary remedy.
The primary source for this body of law is article 1184 of the
Civil Code.90 That text has remained unchanged since the Code's
promulgation in 1804 as part of Napoleon's effort to codify French
private law. 91 How it operates is reasonably clear if one ignores the
confusing reference in paragraph one to the "implied" terminating
condition and goes directly to the second sentence of paragraph two.
That provision affords a party to a bilateral contract a choice when
the other party has not performed: the aggrieved party may either
"force the other party to perform the contract when possible, or de-
mand termination with damages." Both remedies require the inter-
vention of a court. This requirement, implicit for specific relief
remedies (only a court can "force" a party to perform), is made ex-
plicit for termination by paragraph three, which states that "termina-
tion must be sought from the courts." Thus, termination does not
89. See supra text accompanying note 34.
90. Article 1184 contains three paragraphs which read as follows (author's translation):
[1] The terminating condition is always implied in bilateral contracts in case one
of the two parties does not perform the agreement.
[2] In that case the contract is not terminated as a matter of right (de plein
droit). The party in whose favor the agreement has not been performed has a choice
either to force the other party to perform the contract when possible, or to demand
termination with damages.
[3] Termination must be sought from the courts, and a delay may be granted the
defendant, according to the circumstances.
CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 1184 (Fr.).
91. Article 1184, like many articles in the Code, did not create but merely made uniform
customs that were already widespread in pre-revolutionary France. A full understanding of its
purpose must therefore await Part IV's description of its historical background.
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occur as "a matter of right" or "by operation of law" (two possible
translations of the phrase de plein droit appearing in the first sentence
of paragraph two) simply because one party does not perform its side
of the agreement. There can be no discharge of the other party's obli-
gation to perform until that party secures the contract's termination
from a court. Article 1184 thus tells aggrieved parties such as Her-
bert Harrison92 that they cannot terminate a contract on their own
initiative. If they believe the other party's nonperformance is serious
enough to warrant termination of the contract, they must seek that
relief from the courts. Above all, article 1184 tells aggrieved parties
not to assume the role of judge in their own cause.
While addressing the issue of discharge in article 1184, the Civil
Code does not address, at least not as a general matter, whether a
party to a bilateral contract may withhold or suspend its performance
if the other party's performance is due but not forthcoming. Never-
theless, after much hesitation, the courts have recognized the defense
of nonperformance, generally designated by its Latin name exceptio
non adimpleti contractus, which allows an aggrieved party to suspend
its performance on its own initiative.93 The availability of that de-
fense, while not directly contrary to article 1184's requirement of judi-
cial intervention for termination, has certainly limited the negative
effects of that rule. If a breach is serious enough and the court accepts
the defense of nonperformance, the party-in-breach, such as the ap-
prentice in Kingston, is unable to obtain specific relief from the other
party or hold that party liable in damages for nonperformance. The
latter party, however, cannot terminate the contract on its own initia-
tive, as Herbert Harrison did, or do anything to preclude performance
of its contractual obligations, such as reselling identified goods to an-
other buyer or hiring another contractor to finish promised repairs.
In theory, at least, a party remains bound by its promise until it has
obtained a discharge from a court. 94
In summary, under contemporary French law, a contractant
cannot claim a discharge unilaterally, and thus remains bound until it
92. For a discussion of the Harrison case, see supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 206-220.
94. For a recent case upholding this proposition, see Cass. com., 24 June 1980, 1981
Dalloz Jurisprudence [D. Jur.] I.R. 40. In that case, a buyer repudiated a contract for the sale
of an automobile when the seller had not yet delivered the automobile three months later. The
contract provided for delivery as soon as possible. The seller obtained judicial termination and
damages because its breach did not allow the buyer, "on its own authority, and without re-
course to the courts, to repudiate the contract." One treatise has sought, rather lamely, to
justify that result on the grounds that the three-month delay was not an essential breach. P.
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obtains termination from a court. However, a party can suspend per-
formance unilaterally if the other party is in breach. Courts, as we
will learn,95 grant termination and recognize the defense of nonper-
formance only for "grave" breaches. Although similar to the com-
mon-law doctrine of material breach, this limitation focuses more on
the innocent party's good faith in responding to the breach. Good
141IL11 1C4U11Vb 4 1VbpV1ibC LiiaL LO jJ1UI Llonatct *U +UiE.U~O3
breach.
The following three parts of this article analyze two remedies for
breach; (1) the judicial termination of the contract, and (2) the ag-
grieved party's suspension of performance. The article also discusses
how these two remedies fit into the general French law on contract
remedies. First, Part III will address the broad restitutionary remedy
which accompanies termination. The scope of that remedy assures it
a place of considerable importance in contemporary French law. Part
IV will then explain the genesis of article 1184's requirement that an
aggrieved party obtain termination from a court. Finally, Part V will
describe the damage control efforts conducted by scholars and courts
to limit the negative effects of article 1184. The result will not be the
one suggested above, that perhaps the French approach would have
saved Herbert Harrison, but quite a different one based on the capac-
ity of legal systems to defuse absurd rules. Article 1184's requirement
of judicial termination for the discharge of contractual obligations is,
if not an absurd rule, certainly a most unrealistic one. It is unrealistic
because it requires the innocent party to assume the burden of litiga-
tion in disputes over contract performance. The capacity of the
French legal system to adjust to such a rule, to overlook it when nec-
essary, and to manipulate it by interpretation, demonstrates once
again the creative role of the judiciary.
9 6
MALAURIE & L. AYNtS, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL; LES CONTRATS SPtCIAUX n° 437, at 173
n.137 (1986).
Dalloz [D.] and Juris Classeur Perodique [J.C.P.] (also known as La semaine juridique)
are the leading privately published French case reports. They publish a weekly selection of
decisions, many of them accompanied by case notes written by leading jurists. French citation
form for cases generally does not include the names of the parties but only the date of the
decision (here June 24, 1980) and the identity of the court (here the Commercial Chamber of
the Court of Cassation, France's highest court). "Jurisprudence" is the French word for cases
or case law. Citations to French treatises, such as the Malaurie and Ayn~s work on particular
contracts, generally include the section number (n*) which does not change from edition to
edition.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 139 and 212.
96. See A. WATSON, FAILURE OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 22 (1988), where the au-
thor makes a similar point on the French legal system's ability to live with the absurd rules on
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It may also demonstrate the disadvantage of freezing such a spe-
cific requirement in the text of a Code. Case law rules fade away
more readily than do codified rules when subsequently perceived to be
outmoded or unwise. Witness the fate of Towers v. Barrett and Hunt
v. Silk, two questionable English cases decided almost contemporane-
ously with the promulgation of the Civil Code.97 Despite the exces-
sive weight often given to precedent in English law, it is doubtful that
these artifacts can do much mischief today. Too much water and too
many new cases have gone over the dam in the interim. 98 On the
other hand, French lawyers and judges must still contend with the
text of article 1184.
III. THE POSITIVE SIDE OF ARTICLE 1184: TERMINATION AS A
REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Modern contract law offers a party to a contract three basic rem-
edies for its breach: specific relief, damages, and termination.99 Spe-
cific relief is more widely available in France than it is in England and
America, where the aggrieved party usually must settle for the substi-
tutionary relief provided by damages. French law, on the other hand,
prefers to enforce the agreement of the parties. lOO Courts may order a
defendant to perform any contractual duty which is not a strictly per-
sonal one.10' One cannot compel a painter to paint a picture, but buy-
ers can usually compel sellers to deliver goods and sellers can always
recover the price. As a practical matter, however, aggrieved parties
usually find it simpler to halt performance and seek either damages or
termination. 10 2  Damage awards, set exclusively by professional
tort liability found in articles 1382-1386 of the Civil Code. For my earlier effort to describe
what the judges have accomplished under the guise of interpreting those articles, see Tomlin-
son, Tort Liability in France for the Act of Things: A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L.
REV. 1299 (1988).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 63-78.
98. For a case limiting Hunt v. Silk, see Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K.B. 500 (buyer of
stolen car obtained restitution of price even though he used it before learning it was stolen).
99. G. TREITEL, supra note 72, at 1. Professor Treitel's survey of the contract remedies
offered by different legal systems is the best work on the subject available in English. For a
general survey of French contract law, see B. NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT (1982).
100. A. WEILL & F. TERRI, DROIT CIVIL; LES OBLIGATIONS n° 829 (4th ed. 1986).
101. One would not discover any such rule by reading the Civil Code. In fact, article 1142
appears to state a quite different rule, when it provides that a duty to perform "gives rise to
damages, in the case of nonperformance on the part of the debtor." C. CIV. art. 1142. For the
Court of Cassation's surprising interpretation of article 1142, and for French law's preference
for performance over damages, see the famous case note by Paul Esmein accompanying Cass.
civ., 20 Jan. 1953, 1953 J.C.P. Jur. II 7677.
102. See G. TREITEL, supra note 72, at 56.
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judges, tend to be less generous than jury verdicts in the United
States, which explains in part the popularity of termination.
The remedy of termination, recognized in article 1184 of the
Civil Code, is primarily a restitutionary one which permits a party to
retrieve its own performance or the value thereof. That remedy, un-
like restitution in this country, 103 is not available to a party in breachbecause paragraph two of a.ti., 1,0 restricts it + "t'h party in,
whose favor the agreement has not been performed." 1°4 For that
party, however, the remedy is more generous because the text explic-
itly allows a party to seek both termination and damages, a course not
always allowed by common-law courts which often hold that a party
who avoids a contract by obtaining restitution cannot also seek dam-
ages for its breach. 105
The practice of judicial termination, as will be seen more fully
below, does have its positive side in that it provides an effective rem-
edy for breach of contract. The remedy's restitutionary nature has
encouraged the courts to extend, by interpretation, article 1184 to
cover cases in which a party's nonperformance is not a breach but is
excused under impossibility or other related doctrines. 10 6  Even
though the excused party is not liable in damages for nonperform-
ance, the other party may still invoke article 1184 to obtain restitution
of its own performance. The courts have also developed under article
1184 rather imaginative solutions for cases in which the defendant has
performed only in part. In those cases, the courts often grant the
103. See Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 374 (1979).
104. C. civ. art. 1184, 2.
105. English law requires the nonbreaching plaintiff to choose between restitution and
damages. See supra text following note 63. Professor Dobbs criticizes this election of remedies
reasoning on the grounds that restitution is merely one way to measure contract damages; a
plaintiff should be able to invoke more than one measure as long as it does not result in double
recovery. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.5 (1973). The Uniform
Commercial Code adopts Professor Dobbs' approach by allowing the buyer, if the seller ten-
ders nonconforming goods, both to cancel the sale by returning the goods and to seek damages.
U.C.C. § 2-71 1(1) (1987). The Second Restatement more cautiously suggests that a party ob-
taining restitution may also recover some incidental damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 378 comment d (1979).
106. The lead case is Cass. civ., 14 Apr. 1891, 1891 D.P. Jur. I 329 (note Planiol), 1894 S.
Jur. I 391 (the Albertini case). Dalloz [D., D.P. or D.H.] and Sirey [S.] are privately published
French reports which merged in the late 1940s to become Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. or D.].
Contract liability under French law is more fault-based and less strict than at common
law. Force majeur (i.e., some unexpected and irresistible force) generally provides a defense for
nonperformance. A. WEILL & F. TERRt, supra note 100, nn°° 410-415. Therefore, defenses
resembling impossibility play a greater role.
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plaintiff a partial termination by discharging some of its performance
duties, while at the same time compensating it in damages for the
other party's incomplete performance. ,
07
For parties pursuing termination as a restitutionary remedy, arti-
cle 1184's requirement of judicial intervention is neither a surprising
nor a significant burden. Parties seeking specific relief and damages
also must go to court to obtain them. What is surprising, at least to
the common-law observer, is the retroactive effect of judicial termina-
tion. Retroactivity results from the combined operation of paragraph
one of article 1184, which defines nonperformance as a "terminating
condition," and from paragraph one of article 1183, which defines a
terminating condition as one that, when it occurs, operates to "dis-
charge" a party's contractual duty and "returns things to the same
state as if that duty had never existed."' 10 8 This definition makes non-
performance, the terminating condition covered by article 1184, more
than just an event which discharges a party's remaining duties to per-
form (what the common law called a "condition subsequent" until the
Second Restatement attempted to abolish that useful term), 10 9 since,
when followed by judicial termination, nonperformance also operates
retroactively to put the aggrieved party into the position it enjoyed
before contracting.
Thus, if a court grants a seller's request to terminate a sales con-
tract for the buyer's breach in paying the price, the court's judgment
107. Id. n* 487. Under French law, a party seeking damages for total breach should, if it
has not already fully performed, also seek at least a partial termination, i.e., a discharge under
article 1184 from any remaining performance duties. As a practical matter, however, a party
seeking only damages, and not the retrieval of any performance rendered, usually does not
request termination. That party's nonperformance is simply not at issue, or becomes so only if
the defendant claims nonperformance as a cost saved when the court computes the damages
caused by defendant's breach. The action is, in effect, one to enforce the contract by obtaining
the substitute performance of damages. This reality conflicts somewhat with the sharp dichot-
omy, recognized in paragraph 2 of article 1184, between "forcing the other party to perform"
(specific relief) and "demanding termination with damages." These two choices do not appear
to exhaust the options available to the victim of a contract breach. No one has ever questioned
the victim's right to sue for damages without demanding termination, a right explicitly recog-
nized by article 1142. See supra note 101.
108. Article 1183, which has remained unchanged since 1804, reads as follows:
[1] The terminating condition is that which, when it occurs, affects the discharge
of a duty and returns things to the same state as if the duty had never existed.
[2] It does not suspend the performance of a duty: it only requires the obligee to
restore that which he has received in case the event contemplated by the condition
occurs.
C. Cv. art. 1183.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 230 and § 224 comment e (1979).
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has the effect of returning the property to the seller."10 The seller,
who is once again the property's owner, may reclaim it wherever it
can be found, II' subject only to the defenses afforded to purchasers of
real property by the recording system 1 2 and to good faith acquirers of
personal property by article 2279 of the Civil Code. 113 To retrieve its
own performance in that fashion, the aggrieved party, referred to as
the obligee or creditor in article ii 83, must, of co-use, ake resti tu-
tion for whatever performance it has received. l l4
The retroactive effect of termination is an application of the more
general rules on conditions found in articles 1179 and 1183 of the
Civil Code. These rules, much criticized for hindering the free flow of
goods,1 15 derive from Roman law and from the customary law of pre-
revolutionary France. They thus appear firmly embedded in French
law." i6 Under article 1179, the occurrence of a condition precedent,
called a suspensive condition in French law, retroactively renders the
contract effective from the date of its formation. This rule has a strik-
ing impact, when combined with the rule, found in articles 1138 and
1583 of the Civil Code, that treats the sales contract itself as transfer-
ring the property to the buyer. '17 The buyer becomes the owner from
the date of the sale, even if the satisfaction of the suspensive condition
occurs long afterward. Still more striking is the retroactive effect,
under article 1183, of a condition subsequent, called a terminating
condition in French law. For example, if a buyer of a horse includes
in the sales agreement a clause terminating the sale if the horse does
not win a specified race, the horse's failure to win the race means that
110. A. WEILL & F. TERRI, supra note 100, n* 489.
111. To reclaim property from a third party, the seller must normally bring, as the prop-
erty's owner, a separate action. C. civ. art. 2279.
112. As a general matter, sellers of real property must record their termination right as
they would a security interest. See article 2108 of the Civil Code and A. WEILL & F. TERRt,
supra note 100, n* 492.
113. That article provides that the possession of personal property is the equivalent of title
("la possession vaut titre"). Courts have interpreted that language to protect persons who ac-
quire possession in good faith. A. WEILL, F. TERRf, & P. SIMLER, DROIT CIVIL; LES BIENS,
nn°° 412-415 (3d ed. 1985).
114. See C. civ. art. 1183, 2.
115. See, e.g., 7 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, TRAITf PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(;AIS
n* 1045, at 400 (2d ed. 1954). See also A. WEILL & F. TERRf, supra note 100, n* 492, at 514
(retroactivity creates dangerous insecurity for third parties).
116. 7 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 115, n* 1037. Professors Colin and Capitant
have argued that the Code's drafters misunderstood the earlier law when the drafters genera-
lized rules intended only for exceptional cases. 2 A. COLIN & H. CAPITANT, TRAITt) DE
DROIT CIVIL n* 1694 (J. de la Morandi~re ed. 1959). This view has not prevailed.
117. C. CiV. art. 1138 & 1583.
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the buyer never became its owner.'
18
This analysis of termination under article 1184 demonstrates that
its principal advantage as a contract remedy is not the discharge ob-
tained by the aggrieved party, but rather the opportunity termination
offers that party to retrieve, perhaps at the expense of the breaching
party's other creditors, a performance already rendered. That remedy
is particularly useful to unpaid sellers, who retain the equivalent of a
security interest in the property sold. In one of the first reported cases
under the 1804 Code, a court terminated in 1819 a sales contract exe-
cuted in 1801.119 At that time, the terminating seller's property claim
took precedence over the claims of an insolvent buyer's other credi-
tors, but at present the Bankruptcy Law substantially restricts that
priority. Today, termination allows unpaid sellers to reclaim property
ahead of other creditor claims only if the court order terminating the
sale pre-dates any insolvency proceeding initiated against the
buyer. 120
Despite this limitation, the possibility of retrieving a performance
remains the most attractive feature of termination under article 1184.
118. 2 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD, & F. CHABAS, LE4ONS DE DROIT
CIVIL; OBLIGATIONS n* 1027, at 1071-72 (7th ed. 1985) [hereinafter 2 MAZEAUD]. These pro-
visions have led Dean Carbonnier to lament that French law is deficient because it lacks any
condition which merely extinguishes an obligation. 4 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL; LES OBLI-
GATIONS § 63, at 230 (10th ed. 1979).
119. Cass. civ., 16 Aug. 1820, 1820 S. Jur. I 300. The trial court had terminated the
contract in 1819 and the Court of Cassation found no error. The latter Court held that it did
not matter whether articles 1184 and 1654 (a more specific article on the termination of sales
contracts by unpaid sellers) provided the applicable rule, because those articles merely codified
a principle recognized by the Parliament of Paris prior to the Code's enactment in 1804. On
pre-Code law, see infra note 177.
120. For present law, see article 117 of the Law of January 25, 1985, reprinted as an
appendix to DALLOZ, CODE DE COMMERCE 602 (1988/89). In the rare case where the seller
obtains termination other than for nonpayment, it is sufficient if the seller initiates the action
for termination prior to the buyer's insolvency. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1987). The Code pro-
vision is more restrictive in that it allows the seller to retrieve goods from an insolvent buyer
only if the insolvency occurred within ten days of delivery.
Under French law, sellers may still protect themselves from a buyer's insolvency by in-
serting in sales contracts a clause reserving to themselves the property sold until the payment
of the price (1a clause de reserve de propritd). Such a clause protects the seller's expectancy
interest in the price rather than its restitutionary interest in the goods. This remedy received a
much-needed boost when the French Parliament confirmed its validity in the law of May 12,
1980, now codified as article 121-2 of the law of January 25, 1985 (reprinted as an appendix to
the DALLOZ, CODE DE COMMERCE). That validation brought French creditors' rights law
into conformity with the norms of the European Economic Community. See 2 G. RIPERT &
R. ROBLOT, TRAIT ft tLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL nn** 3159-63 (10th ed. 1986).
The limited protection previously afforded the seller's security interest explains in part the
popularity of the more general termination remedy.
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The aggrieved party's recovery does not appear limited to the benefit
conferred on the defendant, as is the restitutionary remedy for breach
of contract in this country. 121 Indeed, it resembles more closely the
specific restitutionary relief available in common-law jurisdictions to
victims of fraud, duress, and mistake, who are able to avoid their con-
tracts and retrieve any property lost. Courts exercising equity juris-
diction have traditionally assisted them in recovering their property,
through constructive trusts and other tracing doctrines, while at the
same time protecting the interests of third parties who relied in good
faith on the avoided contract.
122
French courts afford similar relief to the aggrieved party when
terminating a contract for breach under article 1184. The aggrieved
party can pursue its property by invoking the fiction that it never
ceased to be the owner. The scope of the retrieval mechanisms avail-
able do not vary much between the two systems. 123 What is striking is
that French courts offer such relief in cases of breach and not just in
cases of contracts avoided for fraud, duress, or mistake. While spe-
cific restitution and various tracing remedies are theoretically avail-
able in the common-law world when an aggrieved party seeks
restitution for breach, they remain largely undeveloped because of a
theoretical concern over the plaintiff's title124 and a more legitimate
practical concern that the victim of the breach may secure an advan-
tage over the breacher's other creditors. 25 The latter concern is not
as great when a party promptly seeks to avoid a contract by claiming
that fraud, duress or mistake tainted its very formation. Even in these
cases, where there is a stronger case for fashioning an effective restitu-
tionary remedy, courts will deny restitutionary relief when they per-
ceive it to be too "radical" or when they find the unravelling of past
121. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 28, at ch. 4.
122. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.15, at 255 (1982) (avoidance of a contract for
fraud).
123. Common-law systems protect good faith purchasers by recognizing that they may
obtain legal title from a seller whose title is voidable, i.e., subject to a prior seller's avoidance
and reclaiming of the property. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.7
(1973). French law protects a slightly broader class of good faith acquirers. Article 2279 of
the Civil Code provides that the possession of personal property is the equivalent of title. Such
statutory "title," if acquired in good faith, prevails over the terminating seller's claim that it
never ceased being the owner of the property. A. WEILL, F. TERRt & P. SIMLER, supra note
113, n* 514. Both systems protect purchasers of real property through recording
requirements.
124. See supra text accompanying note 32.
125. G. PALMER, supra note 28, § 4.10, at 452-57.
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transactions to be too "disruptive."' 126 French courts do not often
demonstrate any such hesitancy.
French law perhaps reflects a similar concern over the disruptive
effect of undoing past transactions when it stresses the discretionary
nature of the termination remedy. Termination is not available to an
aggrieved party as a matter of right, except where the other party's
nonperformance is definitive and total. However, the reasons invoked
for limiting termination as a remedy seem more paternalistic than
those advanced in this country. French scholars argue that termina-
tion is a disfavored remedy because it destroys a transaction desired
by the parties. 127 Both the innocent party and the contract breaker do
not obtain what they desire, namely, performance or some substitute
for it if performance itself is no longer possible. Thus, if a party sues
for termination, and the party in breach has either performed in part
or is now able and willing to perform, a French court will normally
require the innocent party to accept that performance, combined with
an award of damages to compensate for any delay or other defi-
ciency.128 These decisions denying termination seem to be based on a
certain solicitude for the debtor that is reflected in many Code provi-
sions. One such provision is the third paragraph of article 1184 which
explicitly authorizes the court to allow the party in breach a further
extension in the time allotted for performance.' 29
Long-term installment contracts present a special case where the
disruptive effect of retroactive termination has proved too pronounced
for the French courts to ignore. Does it make any sense to terminate
a fifty-year lease retroactively, when the lessor wrongfully evicts the
lessee in the forty-ninth year? Can the lessee demand the return of all
126. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 256 (1973).
127. Deprez, Rapport sur les sanctions qui s'attachent d l'inexdcution des obligations con-
tractuelles en droit civil et commercial franqais, in LES SANCTIONS ATrACHIES A
L'INEXIECUTION DES OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTUELLES 28, 52-53 (XVII Travaux de
l'Association Henri Capitant ed. 1968); J. CARBONNIER, supra note 118, § 80, at 300; Cassin,
Reflexions sur la resolution judiciaire des contrats pour inexecution, 1945 REVUE TRIMES-
TRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRI. DR. CIV.] 159, 161. The Revue trimestrielle de droit civil
is the leading French law review on private law.
128. 2 MAZEAUD, supra note 118, at n* 1098.
129. French writers often distinguish between the Civil Code, which seeks to protect the
weak (the debtor), and the Commercial Code, which seeks to protect the strong (the
merchant). Perhaps the most well-known debtor relief provision in the Civil Code is article
1244, which authorizes judges to suspend suits and accord delays for performance "in consid-
eration of the position of the debtor." The availability of a separate body of commercial courts
often provides merchants an escape hatch from impractical Civil Code rules. See infra note
227.
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rent paid and offer to pay only the fair rental value for the premises
enjoyed? Courts have traditionally avoided such an unfortunate re-
sult by terminating the contract from the date of breach and leaving
untouched any completed performances. 130
This sensible, well-established practice of nonretroactive termi-
nation troubled some purists because they believed it to violate the
clear Lex L of article I11083, Whi -ChU pro-,,. AmCiU "rptirn
110i1~i II I rng...............un
things to the same state as if the duty had never existed."' 31 This
same text provided the basis for a 1982 decision by the Court of Cas-
sation (France's Supreme Court), which seemingly rejected the estab-
lished practice of terminating installment contracts only from the date
of breach. 132 In that case, the Court of Cassation found that a re-
gional Court of Appeals, a second-level trial court, 133 had violated
article 1184 when it granted a franchisor termination and damages
without requiring it to return all past payments made by the fran-
chisee in breach.
In a 1987 decision, the Court of Cassation retreated from its ap-
parent insistence on full retroactivity when it formulated, for the first
time, a test for determining the temporal scope of termination. 34 The
new test seeks to effectuate the parties' intent. It provides that "termi-
nation for partial nonperformance affects the entirety of the contract
or certain of its installments only, according to whether the parties
intended an agreement that was indivisible or was broken up into a
series of agreements."'' 35 If the parties intended their successive ex-
changes of performances to be a series of separate agreements, then
the courts should honor that intent and should not upset past per-
formances when terminating for breach.
The crucial criterion under this new approach appears to be the
equivalence of the successive performances. If the agreement requires
that one party initially perform more substantially than the other
party, then the first party should be able to obtain restitution of that
disproportionate performance upon termination of the agreement.
130. A. WEILL & F. TERRt, supra note 100, n* 491.
131. For a superb summary of the purists' objections, see Cass. com., 12 Oct. 1982, 1984
J.C.P. Jur. II 20166 (note Signoret). For the text of article 1183, see supra note 108.
132. Cass. com., 12 Oct. 1982, 1984 J.C.P. Jur. II 20166 (note Signoret).
133. The regular French judicial system has two levels of trial courts and one appellate
court (the Court of Cassation). The regional Courts of Appeal retry (or at least decide de
novo) cases on appeal from local (departmental) tribunals. Therefore, the Courts of Appeal are
a second level of trial courts.
134. Cass. civ., 13 Jan. 1987, 1987 J.C.P. Jur. II 20860 (note Goubeaux).
135. Id.
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The Court of Cassation adopted this approach in its 1987 decision
when it allowed a student, enrolled in a driver's education school, to
recover a hefty down payment, upon the school's breach of its obliga-
tion to continue providing driving lessons until the student obtained
his license.' 36 The same full retroactivity is not likely to occur under
the Court's formulation in cases in which the parties' successive per-
formances are true equivalents, as where a buyer pays in installments
for goods delivered in installments or a lessee pays a monthly rent for
the enjoyment of the leased premises. In those situations, the Court
respects the parties' intentions, and the text of article 1184, when it
treats past performances as separate, completed agreements and only
terminates the contract from the date of the first breach. Thus, the
Court's 1987 formulation provides a solid basis for continuing the
traditional practice of nonretroactive termination of true installment
contracts. 137
The installment contract cases demonstrate the advantages
which may flow from the involvement of professional judges in fash-
ioning remedies in cases of part performance. Those advantages, as
described by French academics, flow from both the protective and
dynamic roles of judges when an aggrieved party seeks termination
under article 1184.138 The judges' protective role is to insure that the
defendant's breach is sufficiently serious to warrant the termination of
the contract, a remedy which deprives the defendant of any advantage
it expected from the plaintiff's performance. The judges' dynamic
role, on the other hand, is to fashion remedies, short of full termina-
tion, which afford the parties as much benefit as possible from each
other's performances. Those remedies may include modifications of
the contract which reduce the plaintiff's duties under it.
It is unclear to what extent the French system realizes these ad-
vantages offered by the practice of judicial termination. It is difficult
to obtain information because the judges expected to fulfill these roles
136. Surprisingly, the Court did not require the student to make any restitution for driving
lessons actually received prior to the school's breach. Perhaps, having failed the driver's test,
the student received no benefit. But would not the instruction received provide some benefit if
the student recommenced lessons elsewhere?
137. For a similar analysis on termination of installment contracts, see Ghestin, L'effet
rdtroactifde la rsolution des contrats d exdcution successive, in MILANGES OFFERTS A PIERRE
REYNAUD 203 (1985). Section 240 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts similarly treats as
severable any part performances which are agreed equivalents.
138. A. WEILL & F. TERRE, supra note 100, n* 487; H. CAPITANT, LES GRANDS ARReTS
DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE n* 112, at 393 (8th ed. 1984) (case note on Albertin); Deprez,
supra note 127, at 50-55.
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are trial court judges whose decisions rarely appear in the privately
published reporters. Trial court judges have acquired that responsi-
bility under the Court of Cassation's settled interpretation of article
1184. The Court's interpretation of article 1184, at least since 1845,
has denied the aggrieved party any right to termination for nonper-
formance. Under this prevailing interpretation, the trial judges must
UeteLnI1lll1 WIIfLIL I LI1 1Il11p al- mllu, 1Iv Ch all LUC; I.a ,La aiIU
circumstances, has sufficient importance for the termination to be pro-
nounced immediately, or whether it will be adequately compensated
by an award of damages." 1 39 Thus, some nonperformances (including
some breaches) allow the performing party to escape the contract and
others do not. It all depends on the significance of the
nonperformance.
This formulation contributes much less to a definition of material
breach than do the criteria listed in sections 241 and 242 of the Sec-
ond Restatement. However, the Court of Cassation's intent was not
to define which nonperformances or breaches are material, but to allo-
cate decision-making competence in the French legal system. The
Court of Cassation, as the sole appellate court in the hierarchy of
regular courts, reviews lower or trial court judgments only to insure
that they did not misinterpret or otherwise violate a legal text; it does
not review judgments for evidentiary sufficiency. As a result, if the
Court of Cassation defines a question as a factual one, as it does the
question of a nonperformance's importance or gravity, the trial
courts' resolution of that question largely escapes its control. Thus,
the Court of Cassation's interpretation of article 1184 makes the
availability of the termination remedy a factual matter left to the dis-
cretion of the trial court judges.
This phenomenon of delegating broad discretion to trial courts
occurs frequently in French law. Trial judges exercise sovereign, un-
reviewable powers over fact-finding, 14° and the Court of Cassation
139. The quoted language comes from the Albertini decision in which the defendant's non-
performance was excused due to impossibility. Cass. civ., 14 Apr. 1891, 1891 D.P. Jur. I 329,
1894 S. Jur. I 391. Professor Capitant traces its origin to an 1845 decision, Cass. civ., 15 Apr.
1845, 1845 D.P. Jur. I 411, 1845 S. Jur. I 345, where the nonperformance was a breach. H.
CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS n* 154, at 344 n.l (3d ed. 1927). The Court has
repeated its formulation on many occasions, in both categories of cases, although perhaps not
as rigidly as it has other formulaic interpretations of Code articles. See, e.g., Cass. civ., 22
Nov. 1921, 1923 S. Jur. I 82 (note Hugueney) (breach case). Sometimes, the Court has substi-
tuted the word "gravity" for "importance."
140. On factual matters, the Court of Cassation recognizes "le pouvoir souverain des juges
du fond" ("the sovereign power of the trial judges"). B. NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 17.
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tends to define the category of "fact" quite broadly. Perhaps the best-
known example is the Court's treatment of contract formation. 141
The Court treats the required mutual assent as a factual matter and
has declined to formulate elaborate rules, such as those developed at
common law and preserved in the two Restatements, on what consti-
tutes an effective offer or a timely and responsive acceptance.
This judicial reticence may be attributed in part to the skimpi-
ness of the Code provisions on contract formation. However, in other
areas, the thinness of the applicable texts has not prevented the Court
of Cassation from formulating elaborate case-law rules under the
guise of interpretation.142 On the issues of what constitutes mutual
assent or what is a material breach, the Court must believe it unneces-
sary or unhelpful to formulate more precise rules. Its withdrawal
from the scene leaves the matter to the trial courts. Such a delegation
would be unthinkable in our system. One cannot imagine granting
lay jurors, serving intermittently, unreviewable discretion to decide
what is an offer, an acceptance, or a material breach. The situation is
different in France because panels of professional judges preside in
civil cases, and most litigants have access to two levels of trial court
jurisdiction. These special features allow the trial courts to perform
the protective role assigned them under the prevailing interpretation
of article 1184. From this side of the Atlantic, it is hard to determine
how well they perform their role.
Furthermore, considerable uncertainty exists as to whether the
trial courts have fulfilled the dynamic role expected of them. In a
number of well-known cases, where the courts have modified, rather
than terminated, contracts only partially performed because full per-
formance had become impossible, that difficult role has been fulfilled.
For example, trial courts have reduced rents when wartime conditions
made rented premises uninhabitable 43 or caused a rented neon sign to
be darkened at certain hours.1 44 In another case, a court substituted
141. Id.
142. For example, see the immense body of rules on tort liability which the Court of Cas-
sation has developed under the guise of interpreting articles 1182, 1183 and 1184 of the Civil
Code. See Tomlinson, supra note 96.
143. Seine, 23 Dec. 1940, 1941 Gazette du Palais [G.P.] Jur. 1 19 and accompanying un-
signed note. "Seine" identifies a decision by the first-level trial court for the former depart-
ment of the Seine (Paris). The Gazette du Palais is another private reporter.
144. Paris, 13 Nov. 1943, 1943 G.P. Jur. II 260. "Paris" identifies a decision by the Paris
Court of Appeals, a second-level trial court. France's approximately twenty regional Courts of
Appeal, designated by the name of the city in which they sit, retry (or at least decide de novo)
all cases appealed to them.
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the payment of an annuity for an obligation to furnish services when
an elderly woman, who had sold her property in return for lifetime
personal care, became institutionalized and sought to terminate the
sale on the grounds that the buyers were no longer performing the
agreed services. 14 5 These decisions reflect a desire to give as much
effect as possible to frustrated contracts.
Judicial modification becomes more problematic if the partial
nonperformance constitutes a breach, and the court may award dam-
ages to the party seeking termination. Nevertheless, in a very recent
case, the Paris Court of Appeals did reduce the license fee for a meet-
ing hall which did not conform to contract specifications. 146 Earlier
cases had approved rent reductions where a lessor's failure to repair
affected the habitability of the premises. 147 Scholars have defended
these decisions by arguing that what the courts were really doing was
granting the aggrieved party a partial termination with an accompa-
nying award of damages for the other party's breach, a solution which
article 1184 plainly permits. This analysis makes the reduction in the
aggrieved party's performance merely a "shortcut" for awarding
damages.148 That explanation is strained because the courts make no
effort to ascertain whether the breach actually caused any damage. 1
49
In the rental hall case, for example, the Court of Appeals simply re-
duced the license fee without inquiring whether the hall's defects ac-
tually caused the licensee any loss. Once one rejects the "shortcut to
damages" explanation, the cases become quite difficult to defend be-
cause article 1134 gives contracts the force of law between the parties
and article 1243 expressly forbids forcing either party to accept a per-
formance other than the performance due. Perhaps those general
prohibitions of contract modification explain why the examples of ju-
dicial "dynamism" under article 1184 are so infrequent. The cases
ordering modifications appear isolated and exceptional.150
145. Cass. civ., 8 July 1936, 1936 D.H. Jur. 554. The trial court's modification of the
contract allowed the buyers to continue purchasing the property. The Court of Cassation
found no error. For a similar case, see Cass. civ., 27 Nov. 1950, 1951 G.P. Jur. 1 132, dis-
cussed in 2 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 188 (2d ed.
1984) (T. Weir trans. 1987).
146. Paris, 17 Mar. 1987, 1988 D. Jur. 219 (note Mirbeau-Gauvin).
147. See, e.g., Cass. civ., 5 Mar. 1894, 1897 S. Jur I 74 (the famous Levis-Mirepoix case).
148. A. WEILL & F. TERRI, supra note 100, n* 487, at 509-10. One might ask why the
reduction is not the equivalent of a partial discharge, something plainly permitted by article
1184. The answer appears to be that ordering a party (here the licensee) to pay something
different than it agreed to pay is not a discharge.
149. See Paris, 17 Mar. 1987, 1988 D. Jur. 219 (Mirbeau-Gauvin).
150. For a more sanguine view of the willingness of French courts to revise contracts, see
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IV. THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF ARTICLE 1184: JUDICIAL
MONOPOLY OVER DISCHARGE
A. The Problem and Its Origin
Termination has worked reasonably well as one of the remedies
French law offers for breach of contract. Its retroactive effect is po-
tentially troubling, but French law has kept retroactivity within man-
ageable limits. What has proved more troublesome, and has required
more ingenuity to overcome, is the monopoly which article 1184 gives
to the courts in granting a discharge. As will be shown, the drafters'
desire to maintain that monopoly explains article 1184's presence in
the Civil Code of 1804.
Judicial control over the enforcement of contracts is an accepted
feature of both the French and the common-law systems. Damages
and specific relief are remedies for breach available only from the
courts. But what if an aggrieved party to a contract simply wants a
discharge from its own contractual obligations? A prompt discharge
is often a matter of legitimate concern to the victim of a contract
breach. A seller does not want to hold goods for a buyer who has not
paid on time, but rather wishes to sell them to someone else; a busi-
ness does not want to keep an employee or contractor whose work is
deficient, but rather wishes to retain someone new; and a builder does
not wish to continue work for which payment is in arrears, but in-
stead wishes to secure new work. In these cases the aggrieved party's
freedom of action should not depend on the breaching party's willing-
ness to agree to rescission.
The common law has developed rules on the dependency of
promises and on material breach which allow an aggrieved party to
protect itself, first by withholding its own performance and then by
claiming a discharge, when the other party does not perform. French
law has encountered difficulty in devising similar protections. The
primary cause of this difficulty is article 1184, which provides that a
discharge does not occur by operation of law but only by court order.
In addition, the Civil Code does not explicitly recognize, other than in
a few isolated instances, the right of the aggrieved party to suspend
performance (what civilians call the defense of nonperformance).
Must the aggrieved party continue to perform until it obtains a court
order terminating the contract? Surely that result is a harsh one.
Legrand, Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: A Case-Study, 62 TUL. L. REV. 963
(1988).
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Why must the aggrieved party, who believes itself to be an innocent
victim of a contract breach, assume the time-consuming and expen-
sive burden of suing for termination, when it could better protect it-
self by not performing? The latter course offers the further advantage
of making it unnecessary in many cases for the courts ever to inter-
vene. A party who terminates a contract for breach, particularly if
-I co .tract ' S... ...1 a ,yWl iiffer nn damno
worth pursuing in court, and certainly will have no need to seek resti-
tution of the performance it otherwise would have rendered to the
party in breach.
These practical concerns did not trouble the drafters of article
1184, who borrowed heavily, here as elsewhere, from the works of the
eighteenth-century French jurist Robert-Joseph Pothier.15 1 Pothier
recognized nonperformance as a terminating condition, thus making
promises dependent on any performance then due. However, he
maintained that judicial intervention was necessary for the discharge
of a promise. This limitation reflected the concern of prior centuries
that contractants should not judge the merits of their own cause. To
understand this distrust of self-proclaimed discharges, and article
1184's response to it, requires a knowledge of history.
In civil-law jurisdictions history necessarily begins with Roman
law. 152 Roman law recognized four types of consensual agreements
(sale, hire, partnership, and agency), plus various "real" contracts
where one party performed by delivering a thing (res) to another
party, who assumed duties with respect to the thing's care and return.
If the party receiving the thing did not perform, the first party could
obtain restitution from the unjustly enriched recipient. That result
did not flow from any notion of dependent promises because the first
or "delivering" party never made a promise. The "real" contract was
in fact a unilateral one, which the first party fully performed by deliv-
ering the thing prior to the recipient's promising with respect to the
thing. The first party's restitutionary recovery was not a contractual
one.
151. Robert-Joseph Pothier (1699-1772) was in many ways the French Blackstone. He
taught law at Orleans and produced numerous treatises which synthesized the largely custom-
ary law applied by the courts (parlements) in northern France. He was also well grounded in
Roman law, where he found many of his organizing principles. His basic Traitd des obliga-
tions, first translated into English in 1805, had a pronounced impact on nineteenth-century
English law.
152. For a background on Roman law, see B. NICHOLAS, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN
LAW 159 (1967); B. NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 39-41.
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The consensual contracts, on the other hand, were bilateral con-
tracts involving two promises, but Roman law treated the promises as
independent. Thus, the seller remained under a duty to deliver even
though the buyer had breached its duty to pay, and the buyer re-
mained under a duty to pay even though the seller did not deliver
conforming goods.' 53 To avoid this unfortunate result, sellers rou-
tinely inserted in sales agreements a termination clause called a pacte
or lex commissoria, which allowed them to rescind the sale if the
buyer did not pay on time. The prevalence of these clauses reflected
the stronger bargaining power of sellers, and perhaps their greater
vulnerability to breach. Sellers did not wish to hold goods for insol-
vent buyers, but rather wished to resell them as rapidly as possible to
minimize loss.
Pothier, in his basic Traitd des obligations (Treatise on Obliga-
tions), recognized the prevalence in French customary law of termina-
tion clauses similar to the Roman lex commissoria.154 However,
Pothier's treatment of termination clauses differed from that of Ro-
man law in at least two respects. First, Roman law viewed the clause
as a self-help remedy which allowed a party to terminate the contract
when confronted with nonperformance. Pothier, on the other hand,
explained that
in French practice it was customary to summon, through the ser-
geant, the creditor [i.e., the party from whom one is claiming a
discharge] so that he may satisfy the condition with a referral
before the judge who will pronounce the nullity [i.e., the extinc-
tion] of the engagement if the creditor fails to satisfy the
condition. 155
Thus, Pothier required judicial intervention for termination even if
the agreement contained a lex commissoria or similar clause.
156
Second, Pothier recognized that nonperformance could discharge
the other party's duties even if the contract did not contain a termina-
153. Interestingly, for the consensual contract of hire or lease, Roman law ultimately
treated the lessor's and lessee's promises as dependent. See B. NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 40.
The common law has acted similarly only in the last twenty years for real property leases. See,
e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
154. R. POTHIER, TRAITf DES OBLIGATIONS n* 672 (1761). All quotations in this and the
following paragraph come from section 672 of Pothier's text. The translations are my own.
Pothier's American translator renumbers the section and badly mangles the French original. I
R. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 636 (Evans trans. 1826).
155. R. POTHIER, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS n* 672 (1761).
156. Id.
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tion clause, i.e., any clause recognizing nonperformance as a condi-
tion allowing the other party to terminate. But once again
termination "did not occur by operation of law," but by the "judg-
ment" of a court which "[would] discharge the duty."'' 5 7 Therefore,
termination was a remedy available from the courts regardless of
whether the agreement contained a termination clause. According to
rothier, [he absencu of suc. a clause only affeed th e Sope of LIn
remedy. If the party had not protected itself through a termination
clause, then the judge had "discretion to give the nonperforming
party such delay as the judge believe[d] appropriate to perform its
obligation."' 58 The judicial discretion to give the party in breach the
benefit of a further delay was not present if the party seeking termina-
tion invoked a clause making performance an express condition.
In his more specialized Traitd du contrat de vente (Treatise on the
Contract of Sale), 59 Pothier vigorously defended treating nonper-
formance as a basis for termination in all sales. His arguments were
very practical ones. First, he cited Justinian to establish the indepen-
dence of promises in Roman law and then acknowledged that French
customary law "had formerly followed those principles."' 160 How-
ever, according to Pothier, the law had now changed to allow "the
seller to request the termination of a sales contract for nonpayment of
the price although there was no pacte commissoire."' 6' This depar-
ture from the older principles had proved necessary because "it most
often happens that one cannot, without great expense, get paid by
one's debtors."' 62 Therefore, the practical difficulties of collecting
money from contract breakers led French law to recognize that a
party should not be required to perform if the other party had
breached.
Pothier did not directly address why a party confronted by non-
performance had to obtain a discharge from a court. However, he did
present a hypothetical which may explain why he believed the judges'
role to be so important when a party sought to terminate.163 The hy-
pothetical involved the sale of land where the seller had promised to
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. R. POTHIER, TRAITt DU CONTRAT DE VENTE n* 475 (1764). Once again the transla-
tions are my own. For an English translation, see R. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE CON-
TRACT OF SALE (C. Little & J. Brown trans. 1830).
160. R. POTHIER, supra note 155, n* 475.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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allow the buyer to graze cattle on the seller's adjoining land. Could
the buyer terminate the sale if the seller were evicted from the adjoin-
ing land and the buyer lost the grazing rights? To Pothier, the answer
depended on whether the buyer would have bought the land without
the grazing rights. If so, perhaps because other grazing opportunities
were available, then the court should not terminate the sale but only
reduce the price which the buyer was required to pay. If the buyer
would not have purchased the land without the grazing rights, then
the court should terminate the sale by discharging the buyer's duty to
pay. 64 This hypothetical demonstrates that Pothier envisioned that
judges, at least in the absence of a termination clause (there was none
in the hypothetical case), would exercise considerable discretion in
determining whether the defendant's breach warranted a full
discharge. 165
The enactment of article 1184 in 1804 prompted little discus-
sion. 166 Bigot-Prfameneu, one of the four commissioners designated
by Napoleon to draft the Code, characterized the provisions on con-
tractual obligations as conforming "to principles which are in the rea-
son and in the hearts of all men."' 167 In analyzing article 1184, he
presented as among those principles that nonperformance was always
a terminating condition.1 68  Pothier recognized that courts had in-
vented that condition to allow them to terminate contracts even if the
parties had not included an express termination clause. But Bigot-
Prfameneu, somehow misinterpreting a passage in Pothier, instead
based the condition on the presumed intent of the parties. 169 This
misunderstanding appears in the text of article 1184, which provides
164. Id.
165. The terminating buyer, upon returning the land, may seek judicial intervention to
retrieve any money already paid. Pothier, however, was only addressing whether the buyer
should obtain a full discharge or a reduction in the price.
166. The legislative history of the Civil Code, first published in 1827, fills fifteen thick
volumes. See P. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL
(1827). The published materials mainly consist of two things: the debate before Napoleon's
Council of State on the commissioners' draft Code and the presentations before the legislature
(the Tribunat and the Corps lMgislatif) by those charged with defending the Code as approved
by the Council of State.
167. 13 P. FENET, supra note 166, at 215 (presentation before the Corps ligislatij).
168. Id. at 244. Bigot-Prfameneu also recognized as a fundamental principle the authority
of judges to accord a party in breach additional time in which to perform. Id. Before the
Tribunat, Favart defended this "valuable right" as based "on humanity" and as a necessary
tempering of article 1134's more rigorous rule which defines the contract as law between the
parties. Id. at 327.
169. Bigot-Prfameneu told the Corps ligislatif: "In bilateral contracts each party is pre-
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in paragraph one that the "terminating condition is always implied in
bilateral contracts in case one of the two parties does not perform the
agreement."
70
The confusing wording of article 1184 led nineteenth-century
commentators to find the basis for the institution of judicial termina-
tion in the lex commissoria of Roman law. 171  That interpretation
posed at least two serious difficuities. First, why did article i i84 re-
quire the aggrieved party to obtain termination from a court? Next,
how did the courts acquire discretionary authority to deny termina-
tion once they found a breach? The seller who invoked a clause lex
commissoria unilaterally terminated the sale. If the buyer believed
that the seller had no grounds for termination, the buyer had to sue
the seller for breach. If the court disagreed and found that it was the
buyer who had breached, the court had no choice but to respect the
intent of the parties by confirming the seller's termination. Therefore,
lex commissoria looked like an unlikely ancestor for judicial termina-
tion under article 1184. These inadequacies in the nineteenth-century
interpretation of article 1184 prompted the emergence, early in the
twentieth century, of an alternative theory on the basis for judicial
termination. Quite fittingly, its two principal proponents, Ren6 Cas-
sin and Henri Capitant, became two of the most distinguished French
jurists of the century.
sumed to have contracted only under a terminating condition for the case where the other
party would not perform his agreement." Id. at 244.
The disputed passage from Pothier is in section 672 of his Traiti des obligations. Pothier
said:
Even when one would not have expressed in the agreement the nonperformance of
your engagement as a terminating condition of the one I have contracted towards
you, nevertheless that nonperformance may often affect the cancellation of the deal
and consequently the extinction of my obligation. But it is necessary that I have
pronounced the cancellation by the judge.
R. POTHIER, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS n° 672 (1761).
This passage provides scant basis for treating the terminating condition as implicitly in-
tended by the parties, especially when considered in light of the accompanying language recog-
nizing the custom of judicial termination. See supra text accompanying note 154. In addition,
Pothier's analysis in his Traitd du contrat de vente strongly supports the judicial construct
theory. See supra text accompanying notes 154-156. Bigot-Pr6ameneu did not cite any specific
passage from Pothier, but subsequent authors have identified the passage quoted above as the
source of the misunderstanding. See H. CAPITANT, supra note 139, n° 151, at 334.
170. For the full text of article 1184, see supra note 90.
171. G. Aubry & G. Rau, Cours de droit civil franqais d'apr~s la m6thode de Zachariae n°
302, at 82 (4th ed. 1871); C. DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOLfON n° 483, at 462 (1876).
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B. Two Efforts to Achieve Understanding.- Cassin and Capitant
Ren6 Cassin did the major ground-breaking for the new under-
standing in his doctoral thesis, published in 1914 under the title
L'exception tirde de l'inexdcution (Defense of Nonperformance).
172
Cassin established that it was the canonists of the late Middle Ages
who first invoked notions of fairness and equity to argue that if one
party to a bilateral agreement broke its word, the other party should
no longer be bound by its promise. 173 The canonists, however, did not
allow the latter party simply to liberate itself by disregarding its own
promise, but required it to seek a discharge from a Church court. The
Church, which had an interest in the keeping of promises, would then
verify whether the other party's breach provided the promisor with a
legitimate reason for not keeping its own promise.
Cassin described how this practice of judicial discharge, invented
by the canonists, entered the received Roman law of Western Europe
through the writings of Bartolus, a glossator of the fifteenth century
who was both a civil and a canon lawyer. 174 Judicial discharge then
became part of customary French law under the Old Regime through
the writings of leading jurists such as Dumoulin, Domat, and espe-
cially Pothier. 175 These jurists' writings inspired the drafters of article
1184 to require judicial intervention for a discharge, but they evi-
dently misinterpreted Pothier when they based the judicial termina-
tion of contracts on the implied intent of the parties. Pothier, in his
Treatise on Obligations, had done no more than recognize that termi-
nation was available as a remedy for breach, even if the parties had
not stipulated to that effect. 176 He had not meant to suggest, accord-
172. The full title of the work is De l'exception tiroe de l'inexmcution dons les rapports
synallagmatiques (exception non adimpleti contractus). In the late 1930's, Cassin wrote an
updated summary of his thesis which he published after the Second World War. See Cassin,
Reflexions sur la resolution judiciaire des contrats pour inex6cution, 1945 REv. TRI. DR. CIV.
159.
Cassin, in addition to being a distinguished university teacher and scholar, fought val-
iantly in World War I, spearheaded inter-war French efforts to alleviate the plight of refugees,
rallied immediately to de Gaulle's June 18, 1940 call to continue the war against Germany,
served as a head of the French Council of State from 1941 to 1960, founded the International
Institute for the Rights of Man, and received in 1968 the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts on
behalf of the rights of man. On October 5, 1987, the French government transferred his ashes
to the Pantheon. For biographical tributes, see 1987 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC 1425-48.
173. The canonists' motto was Frangenti fidem, fides non servanda est. R. CASSIN,
L'EXCEPTION TIRtE DE L'INEXI-CUTION 44-46 (1914) (quoting Bartolus).
174. R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 42-55.
175. Id. at 124-37.
176. R. POTHIER, supra note 169, n* 672.
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ing to Cassin and (later) Capitant, that the courts' authority to termi-
nate a contract depended on the intent of the parties. 177
Henri Capitant, in his seminal work, first published in 1923
under the title De la cause des obligations (Of the Cause of Obliga-
tions), both confirmed Cassin's findings and gave a sounder theoretical
basis to the concept of termination.17 8 Capitant found that basis in
the notion of "cause," one of the four prerequisites to a valid contract
enumerated in article 1108 of the Civil Code. 179 The significance of
that requirement has generated much controversy.1 80 Basically,
French jurists define the cause as the purpose or goal pursued by a
promisor, i.e., the reason why the promisor assumed a contractual
duty. In bilateral contracts, each party's promise provides the cause
for the other's promise, but gratuitous promises, which are enforcea-
ble in France if the parties observe certain formalities, also have a
valid cause in the promisor's desire to make a gift. Promises made
unenforceable by the cause requirement included those made for an
illicit cause, e.g., promises made in return for sexual favors. Thus,
French law requires that a promisor have some proper reason for
promising, but that reason need not be, as required by the bargain
theory of consideration, the desire to obtain something in exchange.
The "cause" required by the French Civil Code for the enforcement of
a promise is both broader and looser than the "consideration" re-
quired by the common law.
Capitant argued that a promise required a valid cause not only at
the contract formation stage, but also at the performance stage.' l8
Thus, in the case of a bilateral contract, if one party did not perform
177. For a summary of Cassin's (and Capitant's) argument, see H. CAPITANT, supra note
139, nn°° 150-151 (3d ed. 1927). Capitant recognized that the institution of judicial termina-
tion never developed in some areas of southern France where the parlements (regional courts)
applied a purer Roman law. Id. at 331 n. 1. Before the unification accomplished by the Civil
Code, there was often a sharp distinction between the customary law applied by the parlements
of northern France (including Paris) and the "written" or Roman law prevailing in the South.
178. Professor Capitant wrote, with Ambroise Colin and later Julliot de la Morandi~re,
the most successful student text on the Civil Law published in the first half of the century.
Their Cours elomentaire de droit civilfranqais went through eight editions between 1914 and
Capitant's death in 1937. His other publications, academic honors, and professional activities
fill thirteen pages in ETUDES DE DROIT CIVIL A LA MfMOIRE DE HENRI CAPITANT xi-xxiii
(1977). He also inaugurated the first and only case book of decisions interpreting the Civil
Code. See H. CAPITANT, supra note 138.
179. The other prerequisites are the capacity and the consent of the parties and a definite
subject matter (objet) for the agreement. C. cir. art. 1108.
180. For a summary of the debate, see B. NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 112-31.
181. For the argument summarized in the three paragraphs which follow, see H. CAPI-
TANT, supra note 139, n* 147.
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its promise, the other party's promise no longer had a cause. To Capi-
tant, excused nonperformance provided the clearest example of this
phenomenon. If impossibility or other force majeure excused one
party's performance, then the other party need not perform because
its promise now lacked a cause.182 This result, which the common
law explains in terms of a failure of consideration, is a sensible one,
but one which finds little explicit support in the Civil Code other than
through Capitant's interpretation of the cause required by article
1108. To Capitant, the same result followed if the other party's non-
performance constituted a breach.183 He condemned as sheer sophis-
try the argument that the cause did not vanish in the latter case
because the innocent party could still enforce the breacher's promise
by seeking specific relief or damages. Those options were not avail-
able if the nonperformance were excused, but that distinction carried
no weight because the cause which made the innocent party's promise
enforceable was not just the return promise but the promised per-
formance. In terms reminiscent of Corbin, 184 Capitant argued that
promisors bind themselves to obtain a desired performance, and not
to purchase a lawsuit.1 85
Most of what Capitant says makes a great deal of sense, but he
does not adequately explain why only judges can discharge a prom-
isor. The explanation he advances for the judicial termination of con-
tracts is largely historical. Medieval canonists and Old Regime jurists
gave that power exclusively to judges, and the drafters of the Civil
Code simply continued that tradition. In defense of that tradition,
Capitant does no more than suggest that judges may protect debtors
from creditors who exaggerate trivial breaches and may preserve, to
the extent possible, partially performed contracts. Even though he is
on the right side of the Atlantic to conduct such an inquiry, Capitant
does not seek to ascertain whether judges have in fact done those good
things.
What, therefore, explains the survival of the historical relic of
judicial termination at the end of the twentieth century? Perhaps its
staying power is merely attributable to its inclusion in textual form in
article 1184 of the Code. Grant Gilmore has described how statutes
tend to address past generations' problems; they survive, despite their
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 653 (1960).
185. H. CAPITANT, supra note 139, n* 147.
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obsolescence, because courts manage to defy or ignore them, which
gives legislatures little incentive to repeal them.18 6 However, talk of
the Code's obsolescence is not popular in France, and French jurists
prefer to find the basis for article 1184's staying power in the general
principle of law that "no one may mete out justice to oneself (nul ne
peut se faire justice d soi-meme)."1 8 7 For these jurists, article 1184's
requirement ofjudicial ieiniatio- reflects a br-oaudcr priipl which
condemns self-help as a contract remedy, a principle which they be-
lieve pervades much of French law. For example, article 1144 re-
quires that a creditor obtain court approval before seeking a substitute
performance (cover) at the expense of the debtor in breach. Rules
that make little sense when viewed in isolation evidently become de-
fensible when they form a pattern implementing a more general
principle.
No doubt general principles of law, such as "no one may mete
out justice to oneself," do play an important role in French law.
188
Scholars and judges extract them from Code provisions or find them
among the premises underlying the Code itself. Once identified, they
serve as potential sources of law. A general principle never prevails
over an explicit statutory text, but courts use these principles as
guides for interpreting unclear texts and for deciding cases to which
no specific text applies.
The Civil Code may sufficiently disfavor self-help to justify the
courts' treating the adage "no one may mete out justice to oneself" as
a general principle of law, but the adage's source and scope remain
unclear. Cassin, who endorsed the adage only if properly understood,
seems to find its source in the same medieval canonists who invented
the practice of judicial termination. 8 9 He saw as its basis the related
concerns that persons who believe themselves wronged are not likely
to be impartial judges on the merits of their own cause and are all too
likely to disturb the peace if allowed to enforce what they believe to be
186. Gilmore, Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 461 (1967).
187. For a symposium dedicated to that principle, see "NuL NE PEUT SE FAIRE JUSTICE A
SOI-MfME" LE PRINCIPE ET SES LIMITES EN DROIT PRIVfE (XVI Travaux de l'Association
Henri Capitant ed. 1966). See especially Brguin, Rapport sur l'adage "nul ne peut se faire
justice d soi-mome" en droit franqais, in "NUL NE PEUT SE FAIRE JUSTICE A SOI-MtME" LE
PRINCIPE ET SES LIMITES EN DROIT PRIVt 41-94 (XVI Travaux de l'Association Henri Capi-
tant ed. 1966).
188. Boulanger, Principes gdndraux du droit et droit positif, in 1 LE DROIT PRIVt FRAN-
AIS AU MILIEU DU XX ° SIICLE; ETUDES OFFERTES A GEORGES RIPERT 51 (R. Pichon & R.
Durand-Auzias ed. 1950) [hereinafter ETUDES RIPERT]; Brguin, supra note 187, at 47-48.
189. R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 330-31.
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their rights. Cassin found these concerns legitimate, but argued that
the ban on self-help did not bar the defense of nonperformance and
even permitted the unilateral termination of contracts in certain cases.
French law at the turn of the century did not conform to Cassin's
expectations. For example, in an 1876 decision, the Court of Cassa-
tion held that a buyer's failure to pay did not discharge the seller's
duty to deliver; therefore, the buyer could sue to terminate the con-
tract with damages if the seller failed to perform when the buyer sub-
sequently tendered payment. 90 The seller had unsuccessfully
invoked, as analogous authority, article 1657 of the Code, which al-
lows a seller to terminate a sales contract as a matter of right if the
buyer does not accept delivery of the goods within any contractually
prescribed period. That text recognizes a limited right of self-help
(the aggrieved seller could unilaterally terminate and resell), but the
Court evidently believed that article 1657 derogated from the Code's
general condemnation of self-help. It therefore declined to extend ar-
ticle 1657's right to terminate unilaterally to cover the buyer's failure
to pay.
A well-known and still more troubling 1897 decision similarly
found an electric company liable for terminating the services it had
contracted to supply a Paris hotel (the Htel de Lille et d'Albion)
when the hotel fell behind in its promised payments.' 9' The hotel
successfully sued the electric company in the lower courts under arti-
cle 1184 for termination of the contract and damages. The Court of
Cassation found no error in that surprising outcome. It held that the
electric company could have sued the hotel for the amounts due, or
could have itself sought termination with damages under article 1184,
but it could not "unilaterally break (rompre) a contract which had not
ceased to exist."' 92
That interpretation of article 1184 was particularly troubling be-
cause it apparently condemned, not only a unilateral or self-declared
discharge, but also a temporary suspension of performance designed
to pressure the other party into performing. 93 The reported facts do
190. Cass. civ., 12 Dec. 1876, 1877 D. Jur. I 228, 1877 S. Jur. I 459.
191. The H6tel de Lille et d'Albion, Cass. req., 1 Dec. 1897, 1898 D. Jur. I 289 (note
Planiol), 1899 S. Jur. 1 174.
192. 1898 D. Jur. I at 290.
193. Commentators, beginning with Marcel Planiol, whose critical case note appears in
the Dalloz reporter following the decision (Id. at 289), have sought to defend the actual result
in this case by suggesting that the hotel's breach was not sufficiently serious to justify even a
suspension of performance by the electric company. The dispute between the parties appeared
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
not make clear whether the electric company claimed a discharge or
merely suspended its performance, and the Court of Cassation plainly
did not care which was the case. That indifference troubled Marcel
Planiol, the decision's commentator in the Dalloz reporter and one of
the most distinguished civil-law scholars of the time.' 94 Planiol was
also troubled by the Code's silence on the defense of nonperformance,
a defense wie;Ih would allow a party to suspend A pfa nce if th.e
other party is in breach. Planiol unconvincingly explained the Code's
silence by characterizing the defense as one of those "elementary no-
tions which serve as the bases for our laws and which the legislature
may overlook in more practical things."' 95
Cassin, in his magisterial work on the defense of nonperform-
ance, sought to dissipate the "confusion" caused by the Code's silence
and to win recognition for the defense as part of French law. 196 He
succeeded admirably, at -least in the latter task. His basic argument
was two-fold. First, the Code was not completely silent on the de-
fense of nonperformance, but recognized its existence in a number of
particular situations. For example, article 1612 allowed the seller in a
cash sale to refuse delivery until paid, and article 1653 allowed the
buyer in a credit sale, when threatened with eviction, to suspend fur-
ther payment until the buyer's title was assured. In these and similar
situations, the Code recognized a creditor's right of retention over a
debtor's property as a means to coerce the debtor's performance. 197
Second, the defense of nonperformance was not inconsistent with
the general principle of law banning self-help. 98 The fragmentary
provisions recognizing the defense in certain situations therefore pro-
to be a good-faith billing dispute which the hotel was willing to arbitrate. To restate this
explanation in common-law terms, the electric company, like Herbert Harrison, overreacted
and committed the first material breach. But that explanation was not the one given by the
Court of Cassation.
194. Planiol was the author of the preeminent turn-of-the-century treatise on the Civil
Code. M. PLANIOL, TRAITt ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (1899). For Planiol's distin-
guished career, see the preface by Georges Ripert to the Louisiana State Law Institute's 1959
translation of the treatise's twelfth edition.
195. 1898 D. Jur. I at 289. The only credible explanation for this oversight, and for many
other gaps in the Code, is the haste imposed by Napoleon during its drafting. Four commis-
sioners drafted the Code in four months, and Napoleon then forced a recalcitrant legislature to
ratify it quickly. On the defense of nonperformance, the tribunal d'appel of Grenoble had
submitted to the commissioners a proposed article which clearly recognized the defense. How-
ever, the legislative history of the Code discloses nothing about what happened to this proposal
and why the drafters "overlooked" the defense. See R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 133.
196. R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at iii.
197. R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 127-37.
198. Id. at 337-60.
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vided to the courts a basis for reasoning by analogy to formulate a
general defense. The Code's drafters had not done so because they
had focused on article 1184's termination remedy to the detriment of
the lesser remedy of suspension of performance. That oversight cer-
tainly did not constitute a rejection of the defense of nonperformance.
One could not infer rejection of the defense from silence, given the
considerable recognition that it had received in the writings of the
canonists and of the jurists of the Old Regime. 99
Cassin's argument is a good example of civil-law reasoning. He
was addressing the issue of whether the courts should limit particular
Code provisions to their terms or should extend them to cover analo-
gous situations. French jurists treat that question as one of statutory
interpretation and often reason by analogy to apply specific statutory
provisions to situations not covered by the text if construed liter-
ally.2°° Extensions by analogy occur frequently in contract law be-
cause the Civil Code contains very few general provisions applicable
to all contracts. A much larger number of special provisions apply
only to particular contract types, usually derived from Roman law,
such as contracts for sale, lease, or deposit. For example, the Code
addresses what we call the failure of consideration defense in only a
few fragmentary articles, such as article 1722, which provides that a
lessee need not pay rent if the thing leased is destroyed. It is neverthe-
less possible to generalize the defense through reasoning by analogy.
What is appropriate for leases may be appropriate for other contracts
as well. 20 '
This tendency to reason by analogy, to generalize rules whenever
appropriate, is a useful response to gaps and inadequacies in the Code.
Courts reject it primarily when they find that a particular Code article
derogates from a more general principle. In these cases, courts inter-
pret the disfavored article narrowly, not by analogy, so as to limit it to
its terms. For example, in the 1876 decision discussed above,20 2 the
Court of Cassation so interpreted article 1657, which allows a seller to
terminate a sale unilaterally when the buyer refuses delivery. That
199. Id. at 132.
200. See Tomlinson, supra note 96, at 1305-10.
201. Although this mode of reasoning occurs frequently, the Court of Cassation, in the
Albertini decision, preferred to reason that a promisor's promise lacked a cause if the doctrine
of impossibility excused the other party from performing its promise. Cass. civ., 14 Apr. 1891,
1891 D.P. Jur. I 329, 1894 S. Jur. 1 391. That decision then became the principal support for
Professor Capitant's efforts to find the basis for termination in a continuing requirement that a
promise have a cause.
202. See supra text accompanying note 190.
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article's authorization of self-help does appear to be a special provi-
sion responding to the special need of a seller to resell goods thrust
upon it by the buyer's refusal to accept them. Thus, the Court limited
the article to its terms.
Cassin and other proponents of the defense of nonperformance
have advanced a number of arguments to distinguish it from self-help,
UL L L  I. LlJaL iL aa 11 IA.,.uPLaUlu. IJI Oii-'iZip. hAL IALt
characterization appears more accurate in light of the fact that a party
who suspends its own performance often desires to coerce the other
party into performing. That tactic appears to be a form of self-help,
but it is nevertheless purely defensive and involves "no positive act of
violence of the kind to trouble the public peace.' ' 2°4 According to
Cassin and his followers, its legitimacy rests on notions of fairness and
equity first developed by the medieval canonists. A party in breach
who demands the other party's performance does not act in good
faith, and the victim of that aggression may legitimately defend its
patrimony by refusing to perform. Ideally, the victim should invoke
the aid of the courts, but usually there is no time to do so. The victim
needs to defend itself at once, and naturally does so at its peril. Fortu-
nately, the defensive suspension of performance affects only the al-
leged aggressor's estate and not its person.
Although much of this argument sounds strange and unneces-
sary to common-law ears, in a way the civilians are only clearing
away some local underbrush before addressing the more difficult ques-
tion of how to determine the order of performance under a bilateral
contract. Indeed, both Cassin and Capitant analyze at length the or-
der of performance question, and reach conclusions similar to those
reached by the common law, namely, presumptions in favor of simul-
taneous performances and of forcing the party whose performance is
more complex to perform first. 20 5 The defense of nonperformance
thus allows the parties to maintain the desired contractual equilib-
rium or, as explained by Capitant, allows a promisor at least to sus-
pend its own performance if its promise no longer has a cause.
203. Cassin's most prominent successor is Jean-Francois Pillebout, a notary who pub-
lished in 1971 his doctoral thesis Recherches sur l'exception d'inexdcution. The core of their
argument appears at R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 42-46, 421-29; J. PILLEBOUT, RECHERCHES
SUR L'EXCEPTION DE L'INEXf-CUTION 197-99 (1971).
204. R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 422.
205. Id. at 440-555; H. CAPITANT, supra note 139, nn** 123-131.
[Vol. 12:139
1989] Performance Obligations of the Aggrieved Contractant 189
V. JUDICIALLY FASHIONED ESCAPE HATCHES
FROM ARTICLE 1184
Twentieth-century French judges have labored mightily to re-
duce the impact of article 1184's absurd rule requiring judicial termi-
nation to discharge a promisor. The three most prominent escape
hatches recognized by the judges have been the defense of nonper-
formance, express terms allowing a party to terminate a contract
without any judicial intervention and the power of unilateral termina-
tion - a rupture unilaterale to distinguish this phenomenon from the
judicial termination (risolution) recognized by the Code. The impact
of these devices makes contemporary, French law on the suspension
and discharge of contractual duties not much different, at least in ac-
tual operation, from the common law. In both systems, questions of
suspension or discharge normally arise in suits by parties in breach
seeking to enforce the contract; parties who merely wish to escape
their contractual obligations rarely have sufficient incentives to sue.
Similarly, neither system gives the aggrieved party any real guidance
on when it may respond to breach by suspending its own performance
or terminating the contract. This situation does not trouble French
jurists who believe that the over-arching requirement of good faith,
applied after the fact by professional judges, provides the parties with
sufficient flexibility to protect their interests during contract
performance.
A. The Defense of Nonperformance
Cassin defined the defense of nonperformance to cover only an
innocent party's suspension of its own performance in order to coerce
the other party's performance.20 6 The party invoking it does not
claim a discharge but seeks to enforce the agreed exchange. Thus, the
defense provides a self-help remedy for maintaining contracts but not
for escaping from them. Cassin recognized that this sharp theoretical
distinction often breaks down in actual practice. 2°7 A party withhold-
ing its own performance may not make clear whether it still wishes to
have the other party perform and whether it would still perform upon
receiving it. More significantly, the passage of time or other change in
circumstances may preclude any subsequent conforming performance
by the party in breach. When that occurs, the aggrieved party's sus-
pension of performance effectively becomes a termination. That tran-
206. R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 365.
207. Id. at 365-66, 397-98.
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sition from suspension to termination also occurs when the aggrieved
party is no longer willing to complete the exchange. At this point, the
party has shifted from invoking the defense of nonperformance to
claiming a discharge. According to Cassin, that party, if sued, should
invoke article 1184 defensively by asking the court to terminate the
contract, and the court should do so at the defendant's behest if the
piaintiff's breach was important enough to warrant it.20
Contemporary French law, unlike French law at the turn of the
century, largely conforms to Cassin's expectations. Defensive termi-
nation has not taken hold, but courts and scholars now universally
recognize the defense of nonperformance. The court's broad formula-
tion of that defense undermines article 1184 by including within the
defense cases in which the defendant actually seeks to escape the con-
tract by claiming a discharge. How this all occurred is not crystal
clear. Perhaps the best explanation is that everyone found Cassin's
argument persuasive. All subsequent writers cite his work approv-
ingly, if not reverently.
The most well-known case recognizing the defense, perhaps on
account of its colorful facts, is that of Monsieur Dubosc, the irritable
curist of Chitel-Guyon. 20 9 Dubosc became annoyed by various con-
trols instituted by the owners of that venerable spa and refused to
present his bather's card while using their facilities. The company's
agents promptly confiscated his card (reimbursing him for the entry
fee) and expelled him from the premises. Dubosc, now genuinely
irate over the interruption of his cure, claimed damages for breach of
contract, but lost when the Court of Cassation ruled that the resort's
response to his behavior was legitimate. The Court reasoned that
Dubosc was himself in breach for refusing to show his card, and that
the spa could respond to Dubosc's breaches by suspending its per-
formance through retention of his bather's card. Dubosc had argued
that the spa's actions, in particular the reimbursement of the entry
fee, represented more than the suspension of performance and consti-
tuted a definitive and complete rupture of the contract. He argued
that the spa could not take these actions without obtaining a dis-
charge from the courts under article 1184. The Court of Cassation
did not dispute Dubosc's interpretation of article 1184 as conferring
on judges a monopoly over discharges, but it held that it was within
208. Id. at 365, 404.
209. Cass. civ., 5 Dec. 1934, 1935 S. Jur. I 46, 1935 G.P. Jur. 1 134. For a discussion of
this case, see J. PILLEBOUT, supra note 203, at 73-75.
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the discretion (pouvoir souverain d'apprdciation) of the trial judges to
find that the spa had only suspended its performance when it retained
Dubosc's card. In so ruling, the Court legitimatized the defense of
nonperformance.
More recent decisions explicitly designate the defense under its
Latin name exceptio non adimpleti contractus.210 Its availability is
clearest in cases in which the party in breach has not performed at
all.2 1 In those cases, the aggrieved party may suspend performance
without any fear of liability. For cases of partial nonperformance, the
Court of Cassation has developed a formula for determining whether
a suspension of performance is permissible. That formula, which the
Court has repeated literally hundreds of times, gives even less gui-
dance to contractants than does the Second Restatement's effort in
section 241 to define material breach. According to the Court: "In
bilateral contracts, nonperformance by one of the parties of some of
the agreement does not necessarily liberate the other from all of its
obligations; it belongs to the judge to decide, according to the circum-
stances, if the nonperformance is grave enough to cause any such re-
sult.12 1 2 This formula - a "nothing burger" of a rule if there ever
was one - has become, in the opinion of the author of the most re-
cent study on the defense, classic or set.21 3 The sphinx will say no
more.
The Court of Cassation's enigmatic formula prompts a number
of observations. First, the Court has not presented its formula as the
interpretation of any statutory text. This rule appears to be purely
judge-made, or "praetorian" as the civilians would say. Its defenders,
if pressed, might designate its source as the third paragraph of article
1134, which requires parties to perform their contracts in good faith.
Arguably, the duty of good faith performance requires a party to con-
tinue performing despite a trivial breach by the other party, but the
Court has not presented its formula as an interpretation of that text.
Second, the formula uses the ambiguous word "liberate" to de-
scribe the potential effect of a breach on the other party's duty to
perform. That word raises connotations of discharge; it indicates that
210. For a recent example, see Cass. com., 27 Jan. 1970, 1970 J.C.P. Jur. 11 16554 (note
Huet).
211. Id.
212. J. PILLEBOUT, supra note 203, at 210. For a more recent decision applying this
formula to uphold a farmer's refusal to perform part of his contract with an agricultural coop-
erative, see Cass. civ., 5 Mar. 1974, 1974 J.C.P. Jur. I 17707 (note Voulet).
213. J. PILLEBOUT, supra note 203, at 210.
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the judges will not scrutinize too closely the aggrieved party's conduct
to assure that it did no more than suspend its own performance to
coerce the exchange. Take, for example, the lead case of the irritable
curist. 214 Did not the spa consider itself discharged from providing
any additional services to Dubosc when it reimbursed the entry fee?
Nevertheless, the Court of Cassation treated the spa's actions as a
suspension of performance. Under the common law, the spa would
surely have argued that the curist's material breach discharged its de-
pendent promise to furnish bathing services. French law, on the other
hand, seems inclined to apply the suspension formula without much
inquiry as to whether the "suspender" really was claiming a dis-
charge. This preference is readily explained by the looming presence
of article 1184 and the monopoly over discharge which it grants to the
courts. Courts naturally feel more comfortable recognizing a party's
right to suspend performance than to claim a discharge. The latter
claim conflicts more openly with article 1184.
Third, the intended audience of the Court of Cassation's formula
is primarily the lower courts or trial judges who must apply it. The
Court does not attempt to give guidance to contractants, but delegates
authority to trial judges, who must determine whether the nonper-
formance was "grave enough" to justify the aggrieved party's refusal
to perform. In the French system, panels of trial judges (there are no
lay jurors in civil cases) write reasoned opinions in which they find the
facts and apply the law to them. As indicated previously, 21 5 the Court
of Cassation (the sole appellate court) does not review factual find-
ings, but only determines whether the lower courts have misinter-
preted the law. Factual matters are left to the unreviewable discretion
or, as the French call it, the "sovereign appreciation" of the trial
judges. The Court of Cassation occasionally exercises some control
over factual matters by treating their characterization as a legal issue
(e.g., was the contract a sales contract or a loan?), but it has not exer-
cised any such control over trial judges' findings on the gravity of
contract breaches.
Finally, the formula's negative phrasing does warn the aggrieved
party that there is something special if not dangerous about withhold-
ing a performance due. It tells the party that a breach "does not nec-
essarily liberate the other party from all of its obligations." Plainly,
the aggrieved party withholds a performance at its peril. However,
'9214. Cass. civ., 5 Dec. 1934, 1935 S. Jur. I 46, 1935 G.P. Jur. 1 134.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141.
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the formula does hint that there is less risk if the withholding is only a
partial one. As the formula states, breach does not necessarily liber-
ate the aggrieved party from "all" of its obligations. Indeed, the
French courts seem receptive to the defense of nonperformance pri-
marily in cases in which the aggrieved party withholds only part of a
performance due, as by reducing the rent paid when lack of heat
makes an apartment uninhabitable during winter.2 16 Here, as in so
much French contract law, the concept of good faith determines what
is permissible.21 7 More specific guidance would only permit con-
tractants to evade their obligations in bad faith. The courts expect
contractants to perform in good faith and to protect themselves
through nonperformance only when necessary to maintain contrac-
tual equilibrium; any suspension of performance must therefore be a
proportionate response to the breach.2 1 8 Within these limits, con-
tractants may defend themselves, but they do so at their peril. Their
actions are subject to a rigorous after-the-fact review which, even ju-
rists favorable to the defense of nonperformance agree, is a necessary
check on self-help.219
The case law further demonstrates the risk taken when an ag-
grieved party suspends its performance. The irritable curist's case up-
held a party's suspension of all its remaining performance obligations
in response to a breach by a party who had already performed in part,
but that case is surely something of a sport. A well-known string of
cases uniformly rejects the defense of nonperformance when invoked
by tenants who responded to their landlord's failure to make prom-
ised repairs by refusing to pay any rent. The tenants acted at their
peril in withholding rent and found themselves promptly evicted.220
Overall, the case law on the defense seems undeveloped, which is per-
haps attributable to the low visibility of most trial court decisions.
Another explanation for this phenomenon is that courts have become
less hesitant about upholding unilateral terminations. The discharge
which accompanies termination provides greater relief to the victim of
a serious breach than does the right to suspend performance.
216. Cass. civ., 10 Apr. 1959, 1960 D. Jur. 61.
217. Paragraph 3 of article 1134 requires that "all contracts be performed in good faith."
Ohi the pervasiveness of good faith requirements in French law, see G. RIPERT, LA RtGLE
MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES (1949).
218. J. PILLEBOUT, supra note 203, at 210.
219. Id. at 239; R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 359-60.
220. Cass. civ., 7 July 1955, 1957 D. Jur. 1 (note R. Savatier). For earlier cases, see case
note by J. Brunet in 1953 S. Jur. 1 177.
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B. Unilateral Terminations
Judicial recognition of a party's power to terminate a contract for
breach has proved to be another fertile escape hatch from article
1184's rather porous requirement of judicial termination. Courts
sometimes label the party's action a rupture unilaterale - literally a
unilateral breaking - to distin~gish it from the judicial termination
(rsolution) recognized by the Code. A party's exercise of this option
to terminate unilaterally does not depend on the presence of any par-
ticular clause in the contract; termination clauses, as will be shown in
the next section, provide a separate and distinct escape hatch from
article 1184.
Starting at the end of the last century, courts recognized, in a
growing number of situations, that one party may respond to the
other party's nonperformance by terminating the contract on its own
initiative. Unilateral termination differs from a suspension of per-
formance because the party treats it as definitive. The party who only
suspends performance treats the contract as "asleep" and subject to
revival once the other party resumes performance; the party who ter-
minates treats the deal as off.221 This distinction resembles the one
found in the Second Restatement of Contracts, which analyzes sepa-
rately when a party may suspend its own performance (section 241),
and when a party may claim a discharge (section 242). In the French
system, unilateral termination also differs from judicial termination
because it does not appear to have any retroactive effect, but merely
discharges prospectively the terminating party's duty to perform.
The legitimacy of unilateral termination has rightly caused
French scholars a good deal of anguish.222 Unilateral termination is a
creation of the judges that finds little support in the text or underlying
premises of the Code.223 How can one reconcile the Court of Cassa-
tion's approval of that practice with the general principle of French
law prohibiting self-help and article 1184's requirement of judicial ter-
mination? The general consensus is that one cannot do so, and con-
temporary scholars do not attempt such a reconciliation as Cassin
221. 6 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 115, n* 428.
222. Id. n* 428, at 577; Deprez, supra note 127, at 55-57; B6guin, supra note 187, at 61-63;
see also Cassin, supra note 172, at 178-79.
223. There is only one Code article explicitly recognizing a power of unilateral termina-
tion. Article 1657 authorizes a seller to terminate as of right if the buyer refuses to accept
delivery. C. civ. art. 1657. During the nineteenth century, the Court of Cassation treated that
article as exceptional and narrowly limited it to its terms. See supra text accompanying note
190.
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and his followers have attempted to reconcile the defense of nonper-
formance. It is difficult, if not impossible, to deny that the terminat-
ing party judges the merits of its own cause in determining whether it
may respond to a perceived nonperformance by releasing itself from
its own promise to perform. The drafters of article 1184, and the me-
dieval canonists who inspired them, condemned that form of self-help
because they believed that the sensitive and difficult determination
was one worthy of impartial judges and not interested promisors. The
judicial recognition of a power to terminate unilaterally thus becomes
an embarrassing, but perhaps necessary, accommodation to the real
world.
The Court of Cassation has accentuated the embarrassment by
making no effort to reconcile unilateral termination with the text of
article 1184. As will be shown, that reconciliation is possible, but
only if one ignores the article's historical background. The Court's
reticence has not deterred the lower courts, actually confronted by
suits brought by parties claiming breach, from rebelling against the
absurdity of requiring the victim of the breach to bring suit to obtain a
discharge. That rebellion became full-blown after the turn of the cen-
tury, and the Court of Cassation has refused to quash it by imposing
on the lower courts an interpretation of article 1184 more consistent
with its text and history.
Two basic principles of law support the rebellion. First, there is
the general principle of law requiring good faith. In part, this princi-
ple is non-textual, but it does find textual support in article 1134's
requirement that parties perform their contracts in good faith. This
principle has generated a large body of case law and doctrinal writing
condemning what the French call the misuse of a right (l'abus d'un
droit).2 24 The misuse of a right, the invoking of a right in bad faith,
usually results in tort liability. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
courts deny relief to a party in breach who challenges the other
party's unilateral termination of a contract without itself offering to
perform. That party is acting in bad faith and is "misusing" its right
to enforce the other party's undischarged promise.
Second, there is the principle that the urgency of a situation af-
fects what is lawful. This principle receives some specific statutory
applications, as in the Penal Code's recognition of various justifica-
tory defenses. Doctrinal writers have argued that it also provides a
basis for avoiding statutory "formalities," such as article 1184's re-
224. A. WEILL & F. TERRI, supra note 100, nn** 638-643.
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quirement of judicial termination. 225 These writers acknowledge that
the substitution of self-help for compliance with a statutory formality
should be a relatively rare event, but they contend that in some situa-
tions the raw facts of the "real" world must prevail over the "ideal"
rules found in the Code.
The operation of article 1144 provides an example of this phe-
nomenon. That article requires a contractant to obtain court authri---
zation for any substitute performance or cover which it wishes to
charge to a party in breach. Taken literally, it requires owners to
obtain court approval before substituting a new builder for one in
breach if they wish to recover any additional costs incurred as dam-
ages. The formality of court approval, while consistent with article
1184's recognition that only a court can terminate a contract, is in-
consistent with the urgencies (or at least the practicalities) of the real
world in denying the aggrieved party an effective self-help remedy.
That tension has sometimes led courts to allow the aggrieved party to
obtain a substitute performance at the breacher's expense. 22 6 In these
cases, the urgency of the situation permits dispensing with the formal-
ity of court approval. These decisions remain exceptional, and there
appear to be none awarding damages to buyers who purchase, on
their own authority, substitute goods from another seller. Although
commercial law recognizes the utility of cover as a prompt, self-help
remedy,227 article 1144 treats cover, in transactions subject to the civil
law, as an impermissible form of private justice unless accomplished
with court approval or justified by the urgency of the situation.
Unilateral termination, the form of self-help with which we are
primarily concerned, initially received judicial recognition in cases
where employers had terminated employees hired for a definite term.
In the first case to attract widespread attention, a village notable
named Combes had, in 1894, employed a certain Mademoiselle
Savagnac as a servant girl for seven and one-half months. 228 Combes
225. Vasseur, Urgence et droit civil, 1954 REV. TRI. DR. CIV. 405, 409; Savatier, Realisme
et idialisme en droit civil d'aujourdhui, in 1 ETUDES RIPERT, supra note 188, at 75-76.
226. The cases usually involved tenants who successfully charged their landlords for re-
pairs which the landlord had a duty to make. See Cass. civ., 2 July 1945, 1946 D. Jur. 4. See
also Carbonnier, Contrats spdciaux, 1946 REV. TRI. DR. CIV. 37, 39.
227. Deprez, supra note 127, at 43-44. Commercial law awards as damages any cost dif-
ferential suffered by merchant buyers who respond to breach by covering; commercial sellers
who resell receive similar protection. These "rules" do not appear in the Commercial Code,
but they are among the commercial practices recognized by the separate system of commercial
courts. 2 G. RIPERT & R. ROBLOT, supra note 120, nn** 2535-2544 (10th ed. 1986).
228. Cass. civ., 26 Feb. 1896, 1897 S. Jur. 1 187.
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dismissed her because he believed she was pregnant and she had re-
fused to allow a physician who had examined her to inform Combes
of her condition. Mademoiselle Savagnac sued to recover her unpaid
wages and damages. In denying her any relief, the trial court judges
plainly based their decision on the facts of the case. Their judg-
ment 229 did not cite article 1184 or any other legal text, but merely
recited the facts, including what the judges characterized as the ser-
vant girl's "self-confessed" pregnancy. The whereas clause in the
judgment which came closest to stating a legal conclusion, oozed sym-
pathy for the employer's predicament. According to the judges,
"from no point of view can one consider an employer bound to keep
in his service a pregnant girl, given how one perceives the immorality
of the conduct, the bad example in the house, the interference with
the work, and the grave inconvenience resulting from giving birth.
2 30
To these judges (undoubtedly all male), it was self-evident that an
employer could show a pregnant servant girl the door.
But what about article 1184, which treats a party as bound by a
promise until a court discharges the obligation? Mademoiselle
Savagnac believed that text contained the applicable legal rule. She
argued before the Court of Cassation that the lower court had vio-
lated article 1184 when it upheld her employer's termination of the
employment contract "by his own declaration and without any judi-
cial decision." The Court disagreed and found no misinterpretation
of the law in the lower court's judgment. As is often the case when
the Court of Cassation finds no legal error, the Court did not advance
its own interpretation of article 1184, much less an interpretation con-
sistent with the power of unilateral termination.
The very next year, the Court of Cassation did extract from the
text of article 1184 a rule similar to the one proposed by Mademoi-
selle Savagnac. The occasion was the previously discussed case of the
electric company which had terminated service to the Htel de Lille
et d'Albion for payment arrearages. 23' The lower court found that
the electric company had breached its contract and ordered it to per-
form. The reaction of the trial judges to the electric company's termi-
nation was quite different, and less sympathetic, than the reaction of
the trial judges to Combes' actions in the prior case. Their judg-
229. Reprinted in 1897 S. Jur. I at 187-88 before the Court of Cassation's judgment.
230. Id. at 187.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 191-194.
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ment 232 recited the details of the billing dispute, the amounts unpaid
(a small proportion of the total bill), and the hotel company's willing-
ness to submit the matter to arbitration. Once again the judgment
cited no legal text and focused almost exclusively on the facts. The
only legal analysis which it contained concerned the mechanism for
compelling the electric company to perform (the astreinte).
Quite plainly, the trial judges in the latter case did not believe
that the hotel's breach (if there was one) put the electric company into
a predicament similar to that confronting poor Combes. The hotel
might be liable in damages for its actions, but, unlike the pregnant
servant girl, it could in good faith demand that the other party con-
tinue to perform; the judges ordered the electric company to do so.
This result is a sensible one, and the Court of Cassation might have
rejected the electric company's challenge by invoking the trial judges'
discretionary authority to evaluate the gravity of a party's breach. In-
stead, the Court advanced an unnecessarily broad interpretation of
article 1184, when it invoked that article to condemn the electric com-
pany's "unilateral breaking of a contract that had not ceased to exist."
That condemnation of unilateral termination was certainly broad
enough to cover Combes' dismissal of his servant girl.
This comparison between the cases of Mademoiselle Savagnac
and that of the H6tel de Lille et d'Albion discloses an unfortunate
feature of the French system of case law. The Court of Cassation
takes no responsibility for synthesizing its precedents. The two cases
are easily reconcilable on their facts, but the Court made no effort to
reconcile the different results. The first case involved a serious breach
of contract which would have created an intolerable predicament for
the employer if he were forced to continue the contractual relation-
ship, while the econd case involved a trivial billing dispute which the
electric company used as a pretext to escape from its contractual obli-
gations. Rather than reconcile the two cases, the Court formulated
two over-broad and largely inconsistent rules, one condemning unilat-
eral terminations and the other finding no error when a trial court
approves a unilateral termination. This phenomenon occurs fre-
quently in French law. As Professor Dawson describes it, the Court
of Cassation has available to it a kaleidoscope of often inconsistent
rules from which it can pick and choose as it wishes.233 The system
232. The lower court's judgment appears in Cass. req., 1 Dec. 1897, 1899 S. Jur. 1 174,
175.
233. J. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 414-15 (1968).
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still works, at least in part because trial judges strive to achieve factual
justice and also, because the Court of Cassation favors rules which
allow those judges' situational sense to prevail.
French case law on unilateral termination still suffers from a tol-
eration for inconsistent rules. Thus, it lacks a clear rule to dictate
when a party may terminate for breach. The Court of Cassation has
never disapproved the interpretation of article 1184 advanced in the
Hdtel de Lille et d'Albion case, but on many occasions it has affirmed
trial court decisions allowing employers to dismiss misbehaving or in-
competent employees 234 as well as decisions allowing wrongfully dis-
missed employees to disregard noncompetition covenants. 235 The
Court has reacted similarly to trial court decisions upholding theatre
owners' ejection of unruly patrons236 and trade associations' expulsion
of members who have violated association rules.237 In the important
area of construction contracts, trial courts have also allowed owners
to terminate contracts unilaterally when the builder is in breach with-
out compensating the builder. 238 The courts have done so in direct
opposition to article 1794 of the Civil Code, which allows an owner to
terminate a construction contract at any time if the owner compen-
sates the builder for the latter's expected profit.239 Finally, in one re-
cent, widely-noted decision, a trial court ruled in favor of an unpaid
seller who had unilaterally terminated a sales contract by reselling
identified goods. 240 That result apparently conflicts with the Court of
Cassation's 1876 decision, which had held that a seller could not uni-
laterally discharge itself from its contractual duties to the first
buyer.2
41
The best explanation for these decisions, and for the growing rec-
ognition of unilateral termination, seems to be the trial judges' reac-
tion to the facts of cases. The leading decisions on unilateral
234. Cass. civ., 25 Apr. 1936, 1936 G.P. Jur. 1 879. On this body of case law, see 4 J.
CARBONNIER, supra note 118, § 81, at 305. Article L. 122-6 of the Code du travail now pro-
vides a statutory basis for the employer's action.
235. See, e.g., Cass. civ., 4 Jan. 1910, 1911 S. Jur. 1 195.
236. Cass. civ., 31 July 1897, 1898 S. Jur. II 85.
237. Cass. req., 22 Dec. 1920, 1922 S. Jur. I 369 (note Morel).
238. Poitiers, 12 June 1918 and 23 Dec. 1918, 1920 D. Jur. II 41 (note R. Savatier).
239. Article 1794's purpose is to allow an owner to terminate a losing construction con-
tract at any time if the owner is willing to pay expectancy damages to the terminated builder.
3 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD, & J. MAZEAUD, LEMONS DE DROIT CIVIL: PRINCIPAUX CON-
TRATS n* 1358, at 768 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter 3 MAZEAUD].
240. Colmar, 7 Feb. 1975, 1978 D. Jur. 169 (note Ortscheidt).
241. See supra text accompanying note 190.
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termination are all lower court decisions, or Court of Cassation deci-
sions finding no violation of the law in a lower court decision uphold-
ing a unilateral termination against a challenge based on article 1184.
In these latter cases, the Court of Cassation usually limits itself to
finding no error or to suggesting that a party in bad faith, or who has
not performed at all, cannot complain about the other party's failure
to seek temination u.de .. .tic 1184. OinIy in the Esiiva case, a
1936 decision, did the Court go further and rule that an employer
may terminate an employment contract without judicial intervention,
whenever the employee has rendered that termination necessary due
to a "grave failure" to perform his contractual obligations. 242
The trial courts' rebellion and the Court of Cassation's acquies-
cence in this rebellion is readily understandable. When a party in
breach sues, not just for restitution but for performance or damages,
the reaction of the trial judges is likely to be similar to that of the trial
judges in Savagnac v. Combes, at least if the breach is a serious one.
Attitudes towards employee pregnancy have fortunately changed
since the 1890s, but attitudes towards contract breach have not.
Judges rightfully hesitate to hold liable the victim of a serious breach
of contract merely because article 1184 suggests that an aggrieved
party remains bound until it takes the initiative of securing a dis-
charge from a court. A rule barring all unilateral terminations would
in effect require an employer to obtain judicial approval before dis-
missing an employee for breach of contract. This result surely was
unintended by the drafters of article 1184, and one which they would
have rejected if they had considered the problem. The defense of non-
performance provides aggrieved employers some protection - they
need not pay a non-performing employee - but employers usually
desire to remove an offending employee from the premises and hire
someone new in replacement. As was shown earlier in the case of the
irritable curist, the Court of Cassation has sometimes evaded article
1184 by refusing to distinguish clearly between a suspension of per-
formance, which does not require judicial approval in advance, and a
discharge, which does require such approval. This evasion tactic oc-
casionally reappears, but courts have been candid enough to recognize
that employers are terminating a contract when they discharge an em-
ployee, as do owners when they order contractors to quit work and
remove equipment from the premises. 243
242. Cass. civ., 25 Apr. 1936, 1936 G.P. Jur. 1 879.
243. See supra notes 234 and 238.
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French jurists have sought to impose some order on this unruly
judicial creation of unilateral termination. The principal concern,
other than the legitimacy of the entire enterprise, is the absence of any
standard for determining when unilateral termination is permissible.
Earlier treatise writers emphasized the exceptional nature of unilat-
eral termination. 244 They read the employee discharge cases to allow
the employer to terminate unilaterally only when the employee's bad
faith or intentional breach created an urgent need to replace the em-
ployee immediately. These commentators reluctantly conceded that
the prohibition against self-help was not absolute, and that the neces-
sities of the situation permitted the aggrieved employer to terminate a
contractual relationship already undermined by the gravity of the em-
ployee's breach. How could an employer retain an employee in whom
the employer no longer had any confidence? Another early com-
mentator, Professor Morel, sought, in a case note to a 1920 deci-
sion, 245 to limit unilateral termination to cases where the breach was
so complete and self-evident that a judicial order terminating the con-
tract would be no more than a useless formality. Article 1184's raison
d'Ftre, according to Morel, was to allow judges to evaluate whether a
breach was serious enough to warrant termination. Therefore, unilat-
eral termination was permissible if the party in breach had not per-
formed at all, or if the gravity of the breach was self-evident.
Twentieth-century courts have never confined unilateral termina-
tion so narrowly. Professor Ren6 Savatier, a leading law professor of
the inter-war years, complained about the absence of such a narrow
limitation in a case note accompanying two trial court decisions
which had upheld unilateral terminations of construction contracts.246
In one case, the builder had been arrested for disturbing the peace (it
was not clear where the offense occurred) and the workers had at least
temporarily left the job site, while in the other case the builder had
used some of the owner's equipment for personal purposes. In both
cases the court found that the builder's breach justified the owner's
termination of the contract. This result troubled Savatier. He ac-
knowledged that the two contractors were at fault, but questioned
whether either breach seriously prejudiced the owner or prevented the
builder from fulfilling its remaining contractual obligations.
244. 6 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 115, n* 428; 2 A. COLIN & H. CAPITANT,
supra note 116, n* 1025.
245. See case note by Morel in Cass. req., 22 Dec. 1920, 1922 S. Jur. I 369, 370.
246. See case note by R. Savatier in Poitiers, 12 June 1918 and 23 Dec. 1918, 1920 D. Jur.
I 41, 43.
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Perhaps those breaches in fact satisfied both of Savatier's pro-
posed criteria, but the trial judges made no effort in their decisions to
convince the reader, as had the judges in the Savagnac case, that it
was unreasonable to expect the aggrieved party - in these cases the
owner - to continue the contractual relationship. Savatier concluded
that the courts might as well strike article 1184 from the Civil Code
..-- 1^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ % %A^. .. Am. %A,.. .. . - , ,- .- .. ... g - + br h esl
were serious enough to warrant unilateral termination. Savatier, like
Morel, suggested a hierarchy of breaches: only the most serious
breaches would justify unilateral termination, an intermediate cate-
gory of breaches would permit a court to terminate with damages,
and the least serious breaches would give rise only to liability for dam-
ages without affecting the aggrieved party's performance obligations.
Professors Morel and Savatier wrote their case notes in the early
1920s. Their prodding has not resulted in any judicial definition of
which breaches justify unilateral termination. The Court of Cassation
seems content to leave the matter to the trial courts. While the Court
of Cassation has a formula for determining when lower courts should
terminate a contract under article 1184 - the nonperformance must
be of "sufficient importance" to make damages an inadequate rem-
edy 247 - the Court has no formula for determining when a party may
terminate on its own initiative. The closest it came was in the Estivant
case, 248 but the decision's "grave failure to perform" test has not been
repeated in subsequent cases. Even in Estivant, the Court did not de-
fine what constituted a "grave failure" or explain how a "grave failure
to perform" differed from the "nonperformance of sufficient impor-
tance" required for judicial termination. The Court simply held that
the trial judges had properly found that the employee (Estivant) had
been sufficiently neglectful and incompetent at selling cars to justify
his termination under the "grave failure" standard.
This uncertainty as to the scope of unilateral termination has not
affected its importance. The present generation of treatise writers rec-
ognizes it to be a more common and less troublesome phenomenon
than had their predecessors. Why should a party not respond to a
breach by terminating a contract, if it can do so without disturbing
the peace and if it is willing to assume the risk of a mistake?249 Is this
not a more practical solution in most cases than suing for termina-
247. See supra text accompanying note 139.
248. See supra text accompanying note 242.
249. 4 J. CARBONNIER, supra note 118, § 81, at 305-06.
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tion? The Germans wisely adopted this approach in their Civil Code
of 1900,250 and some scholars believe that, in practice, French law
now approaches that position. 251 The aggrieved party terminates if it
believes the other party's breach warrants that response, and the other
party then challenges the termination in court if it believes, as will
rarely be the case, that the termination is worth challenging. Under
this approach, the judges play a different role than that envisioned
under article 1184. Judges do not release promisors before the fact,
but determine after the fact whether they acted properly in dishonor-
ing their promises. The judges' new role will be a more limited one,
primarily because they will have fewer occasions to exercise their
power, as most unilateral terminations will go unchallenged.
This new approach is, of course, the American approach, lacking
whatever beneficial guidance the Restatement sections give the termi-
nating party. It is unclear whether the French system has really gone
that far in gutting article 1184. A much-noted 1975 Court of Appeals
decision25 2 supports the conclusion that such a gutting has taken
place, while at the same time the decision suggests the unworkability,
if not meaninglessness, of any rule which binds a promisor to its
promise until it obtains a discharge from a court.
The 1975 case involved an agreement to sell an identified piece of
machinery. The applicable law was the Civil Code, not commercial
practice, which allows a merchant seller to terminate by reselling
upon the initial buyer's breach. 25 3 Relations between the buyer and
seller became quite acrimonious; disputes arose over the extension of
credit to the buyer and the buyer's surreptitious use of the machine.
The unpaid seller, who apparently had never delivered the machine,
became fed-up with the buyer's shenanigans, sold the machine at pub-
lic auction, and then sued the buyer for damages (the difference be-
tween the contract price and the auction price). The buyer challenged
the seller's unilateral termination of the contract and argued that the
seller should have obtained a discharge from a court before reselling
the machine.
The Court of Appeals rejected the buyer's argument for two rea-
sons. First, the court confirmed that the seller could have obtained
judicial termination of the sales contract prior to the auction sale on
250. 3 C. LARROUMET, DROIT CIVIL; LES OBLIGATIONS n* 702, at 679-80 (1986).
251. Id. n* 712, at 687; A. WEILL & F. TERRIt, supra note 100, n* 488, at 511.
252. Colmar, 7 Feb. 1975, 1978 D. Jur. 169 (note Ortscheidt).
253. See supra note 227.
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account of the buyer's breach of its obligation to pay. Second, the
court excused the seller's actual failure to obtain judicial termination
because of the urgent need to resell the machine upon the buyer's bad
faith failure to pay. According to the court, a breach sufficiently
grave to warrant judicial termination also justified unilateral termina-
tion if the aggrieved party must act immediately to protect its
This decision, despite its banal facts and common-sense holding,
has aroused considerable controversy. Two leading scholars have la-
belled as "heretical" its circumventing of article 1184,254 something
which commercial practice has proved quite adept at doing. The
commentator in the Dalloz reporter questioned what special urgency
confronted the seller (the court was quite specific on the buyer's bad
faith but not the seller's need to resell) and questioned whether the
decision did not establish a general rule that a seller could always
terminate unilaterally by reselling if the buyer breached by failing to
pay.255 French law does not recognize any such rule, but its absence
may be less attributable to the requirement of judicial termination
than to the Civil Code rule that, unless the parties express a contrary
intent, the sales agreement itself transfers identified property to the
buyer. 256 Therefore, the buyer owns the property even if it has not yet
taken delivery, and the unpaid seller cannot resell what it no longer
owns. Instead, the seller must first terminate the contract by suing
under article 1184 or by invoking a termination clause of the type
described in the next section.
The need to undo the transaction may therefore limit the seller's
power to terminate a sales contract unilaterally. But when the seller
does not face that obstacle, as where the seller has reserved a property
interest in the goods,2 57 how can the buyer challenge a unilateral ter-
mination? In the 1975 case, the buyer raised the seller's failure to
obtain judicial termination as a defense to a damage action brought by
the seller. This defense is a startling one because the buyer had never
tendered payment. Furthermore, there was no indication that the
buyer was now either willing or able to pay for the machine, or had
any further desire to purchase it. If the seller had not resold, it could
have sued the buyer for specific relief (the full price), while at the
254. P. MALAURIE & L. AYNtS, supra note 94, n* 510, at 213.
255. See case note by Ortscheidt in 1978 D. Jur. at 170.
256. C. av. art. 1583.
257. See supra note 120.
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same time thrusting upon the buyer the unwanted machine. There is
surely an air of unreality to the nonperforming buyer's challenge to
the aggrieved seller's effort to mitigate losses.
The issue before the court would have been more difficult if the
buyer had tendered the price and sought to hold the seller liable for
breach of contract. The buyer's argument would be that the seller's
unilateral termination did not discharge its contractual duty - only a
court could do that under article 1184 - and that the seller was now
liable for its breach in not delivering the machinery. Surprisingly, this
argument has attracted little attention. Cassin, alone among the mod-
em authors, has addressed it when he analyzed the unilateral termina-
tion cases as cases in which the aggrieved party sought termination
defensively. 258 Rather than sue for termination, the aggrieved party
requests termination when sued for breach of contract, arguing that
the court should now discharge it from its own obligation because of
the plaintiff's breach. Thus, the question for the court in our hypo-
thetical case would be whether the buyer's delay in performing pro-
vided grounds for the court's termination of the contract at the
defendant seller's request. If not, the seller would be in breach for
refusing to deliver the property sold.
The Court of Cassation approved this approach in an 1845 case
in which a seller sued the buyer for performance, that is, sought a
court order requiring the buyer to accept delivery and pay for two
shipments of goods. 259 The defendant buyer sought termination be-
cause the first shipment was late and the second shipment was both
late and nonconforming. The trial court, treating each shipment as a
separate contract, granted termination for the second shipment but
denied it for the first. The buyer argued before the Court of Cassation
that a trial court must terminate a contract once it finds a breach.
The Court rejected that argument and recognized the discretionary
nature of the termination remedy.260 There is no right to terminate
for breach, and the trial court did not err when it held that the ag-
grieved party (the buyer) had an obligation to accept the first ship-
ment while obtaining damages to compensate for its lateness.
However, the Court of Cassation also held that the trial court had
properly terminated the contract for the second shipment rather than
258. R. CASSIN, supra note 173, at 365-66.
259. Cass. civ., 15 Apr. 1845, 1845 D.P. Jur. I 411, 1845 S. Jur. I 345.
260. On the importance of this holding, see H. CAPITANT, supra note 139, n* 151, at 344
n.1.
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obligating the buyer to accept a shipment that was both late and
nonconforming.
What discharged the buyer's obligation to accept the second
shipment is a theoretical question of no particular import. Under the
Court of Cassation's approach, there apparently was no discharge un-
til the trial court granted one. But that judicial monopoly over dis-
charge became a matter of little significance once the Court
recognized the defense of nonperformance. This defense permits a
party not only to refuse a gravely defective performance, but also to
withhold its own performance until the other party is no longer in
breach. Thus, an employer may reject the performance of a pregnant
servant girl and a buyer may reject goods that are both late and non-
conforming; both may also withhold performance of their own prom-
ise to pay. Of course, aggrieved parties act at their peril, and the
party in breach may have an opportunity to cure. However, at some
point the breach will become grave enough that the party in breach
can no longer tender a performance that the other party must accept.
At that point, the aggrieved party's suspension of performance neces-
sarily becomes permanent, although one can never be sure that such a
discharge has occurred until a court pronounces or confirms it.
French jurists have never developed Cassin's suggestion regard-
ing a party seeking judicial termination defensively, and the Court of
Cassation's 1845 decision has produced few progeny.2 6' Courts today
do not grant termination to defendants but analyze whether a defend-
ant's unilateral termination, if challenged by the plaintiff, was proper.
Party termination evidently still raises suspicions as a measure of pri-
vate justice, and courts do not wish to give it too much encourage-
ment, as might happen if they explicitly ruled that it did not matter
whether a party sought judicial termination before or after a suit chal-
lenging nonperformance. In addition, defensive termination, while
perhaps consistent with article 1184's text, which only requires that a
party seek termination from a court, contradicts the ideal behind the
requirement of judicial termination: one should keep one's promises
until a court discharges them. To preserve at least the appearance of
that ideal, twentieth-century jurists have hesitated to take the final
step of equating unilateral and judicial termination.
261. For another example of a defendant obtaining termination, see Cass. req., 4 Dec.
1900, 1901 D. Jur. I 518, 1901 S. Jur. I 222.
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C. Termination Clauses
Judicial approval of termination clauses has provided con-
tractants a third escape hatch from the judicial monopoly over dis-
charge recognized by article 1184. Termination clauses resemble
what the common law would call express promissory conditions. 262
They allow a party to treat any specified nonperformance by the other
party, not only as a basis for withholding performance, but also as a
basis for unilaterally terminating the contract and obtaining restitu-
tion of any performance rendered once it is too late to satisfy the con-
dition. Thus, as was the case in the leading nineteenth-century
decision validating termination clauses, 263 a lease may contain a pro-
vision authorizing the lessor to terminate the contract if the lessee
fails to pay any monthly installment of rent. Termination under such
a clause may occur retroactively, as does judicial termination, or the
clause may limit that retroactive effect. In the lease case, for example,
the clause provided that the lessor's termination would leave un-
touched any completed past performances; the lessor could only ter-
minate the lease from the date of the first nonpayment, and then, only
if the lessee failed to pay within thirty days of the lessor's invocation
of the clause. 2
64
Pothier and the drafters of the Civil Code did not believe that a
termination clause eliminated the need for judicial intervention.265
The party invoking such a clause still needed to obtain the judgment
of a court to terminate the contract. At most, the clause eliminated
any judicial discretion to deny termination once the judges confirmed
the nonperformance of the condition. That narrow interpretation of
termination clauses did not prevail for long. What did prevail was the
idea, enshrined in article 1134, that the parties could fashion their
262. On express promissory conditions, see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.2, at 539,
and § 8.3, at 547 (1982).
263. Cass. civ., 2 July 1860, 1860 D. Jur. I 284.
264. Termination clauses in French law differ from what the common law refers to as a
termination clause. In common-law systems, a termination clause allows a party, normally an
employer or franchisor, to terminate a contract prospectively for any reason upon giving some
minimal notice to the other party. The party invoking such a clause need not establish any
breach in order to end the contractual relationship. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17,
at 532-34 (1982). Termination clauses of the common-law variety have not played a major role
in French law, because the overriding obligation of good faith limits a party's opportunity to
invoke them. A party cannot terminate a contract without a good faith justification, even if
the contract is for an indefinite duration and would be, at common law, terminable at will. 3
C. Larroumet, supra note 250, nn °° 203-208.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 154-169.
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own contracts which would have the force of law between them.
Thus, parties could give greater force to termination clauses if they
made their intent clear. If a clause did no more than recognize the
right of a party to terminate for nonperformance, the courts would
likely interpret it as a simple reminder of what article 1184 already
provided. However, if a clause stated explicitly that a party could
terminate without judicial intervention, and without even summoning
the other party to perform, then the court would most likely respect
the parties' intent. Courts interpreted termination clauses narrowly,
but determined parties had no trouble drafting clauses which allowed
termination for breach without judicial intervention. This result was
consistent with the will theory of contract which prevailed through-
out the nineteenth century.
266
Termination clauses have become commonplace in sales, leases,
and many other contracts. Contemporary French scholars have ex-
pressed concern that the stronger party to a transaction, normally the
seller or lessor, may use its dominant position to secure the inclusion
of a clause allowing it to terminate for nonperformance. 267 The domi-
nant party does so because termination under such a clause offers sub-
stantial advantages even if the party invoking the clause must still
seek a court judgment. The principal advantage is the diminution, if
not elimination, of the judicial control over the remedy which a party
encounters if it seeks judicial termination under article 1184. In those
cases, the trial judges must determine whether any nonperformance is
sufficiently grave to warrant undoing the contract, or whether the ag-
grieved party must still perform and accept damages as compensation
for the breach. In addition, the judges have broad discretion to grant
a further delay to a party in breach before terminating the contract.
26
This notorious indulgence for debtors explains the interest of the
economically stronger party in substituting party termination for judi-
cial termination. Similar considerations motivate contractants in this
country to make their own duty to perform subject to an express
266. For a strong defense of the growing recognition that the parties could opt out of
article 1184's requirement of judicial termination, see 4 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 171,
n ° 302, at 84 n.84.
267. Borricand, La clause rdsolutoire expresse dans les contrats, 1957 REV. TRI. DR. CIV.
433, 439-44; B6guin, supra note 187, at 59-61; Deprez, supra note 127, at 53-55.
268. The third paragraph of article 1184 explicitly authorizes the court to grant the de-
fendant a delay, according to the circumstances, before terminating a contract for nonperform-
ance. C. civ. art. 1184, 3. Likewise, the second paragraph of article 1244 authorizes judges
to allow any debtor in breach, in light of its position and economic situation, up to two addi-
tional years to perform. C. cv. art. 1244, 2.
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promissory condition. Courts normally hold that anything less than
full performance of the express condition discharges a party, while
substantial performance of a constructive condition of exchange suf-
fices to force the other party to perform and accept damages.2 69 Thus,
termination clauses and express conditions both seek to eliminate any
judicial role in evaluating the seriousness of a breach.
In the French system, termination clauses also present the ad-
vantage of eliminating any need to sue for a discharge. They permit
an aggrieved party to terminate by a simple declaration or other man-
ifestation of intent. Thus, the aggrieved party can avoid the delay and
expense of suing for termination under article 1184. But this advan-
tage is subject to two major limitations. First, if a party terminates to
obtain restitution, it may still need to invoke the aid of the courts to
retrieve its own performance. The seller who terminates retroactively
may, in theory, never have ceased to be the owner of the goods sold,
but the seller's ownership does not authorize it to seize the goods from
the buyer without the intervention of a court. If the buyer does not
return goods delivered to it voluntarily, the seller must still sue to
obtain restitution. Likewise, a terminating lessor cannot evict the
lessee without judicial intervention. Of course, the elimination of the
courts' protective role strengthens the creditor's position in reaching a
settlement with the party in breach. If the terminating party does
invoke the aid of the courts to obtain restitution, the judges' role is
much more limited than their role under article 1184. In cases of
party termination, the judges' role is merely to confirm that the other
party has not fully performed and that the terminating party has ac-
ted in good faith. 270 The judges have no discretion to evaluate the
seriousness of the nonperformance, and only rarely have they found a
party liable for bad faith in invoking a termination clause.271
There is a second limitation on the advantages offered by termi-
nation clauses. If a party terminates to obtain a discharge, it necessar-
ily acts at its peril. The other party may claim that it had fully
269. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.2, at 539, and § 8.3 at 547 (1982).
270. 3 C. LARROUMET, supra note 250, n0 716, at 691-93; 2 MAZEAUD, supra note 118, n*
1104, at 1132.
271. Perhaps the absence of much case law on bad faith party termination suggests that
courts preach more than they enforce the obligation of good faith performance. The cases
finding bad faith involve parties that have terminated for truly trivial breaches. See Cass. civ.,
14 Mar. 1956, 1956 D. Jur. 449 (payment by mail delayed by holiday); Cass. civ., 6 June 1984,
1984 J.C.P. Jur. IV 260 (failure to pay symbolic franc). But see HWmard, Ventes, transports et
autres contrats commerciaux, in 1964 REV. TRI. DR. COM. 808, 813-14 (discussing Paris, 22
June 1964 which involved over-hasty termination of long-time commercial relationship).
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performed, or that any nonperformance was a permissible response to
the terminating party's own nonperformance. In such cases, the non-
terminating party may challenge as a breach any nonperformance by
the party invoking a termination clause. The terminating party will
itself be liable for breach of contract unless the court confirms that the
first party to breach was the terminating party. However, that risk is
less than the risk assumed when a party terminates in the absence of a
termination clause because the judges need only confirm the existence
of the identified breach. Judges will not evaluate the seriousness of
the breach as they would have to do if a party sought termination
under article 1184 or, in the absence of a termination clause, termi-
nated unilaterally.
Termination clauses still cause French scholars considerable dif-
ficulty. The principal concern has been to reconcile them with the
general principle of law which prohibits a party from judging one's
own cause. Most writers view party termination as a form of self-help
which lacks firm textual support and is therefore of questionable va-
lidity in light of the principle. When confronted with the near unani-
mous judicial approval of termination clauses, scholars tend to
advance untenable rationalizations to support courts' actions. They
suggest that the prohibition against self-help yields when the victim
consents in advance,272 or that the Code somehow tacitly recognizes
the Roman clause lex commissoria despite expressly opting for judi-
cial termination in article 1184.273 Other suggested reasons are that
the courts are merely taking into account practical realities by reduc-
ing the scope of article 1184,274 or that the courts somehow ade-
quately restrain the impulse in favor of self-help by narrowly
construing termination clauses. 275 More persuasively, scholars also
recognize that the invocation of a termination clause is potentially
subject to subsequent judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny serves as a
check on self-help, but provides little protection from the harsh re-
sults which often accompany party termination for what may have
been a minor breach. The common law encounters the same problem
under the guise of the forfeiture which may accompany the failure of
272. 4 C. AUBRY & C. RAu, supra note 171, n° 302, at 85.
273. A. WEILL & F. TERRt, supra note 100, n* 494, at 515-16; 2 MAZEAUD, supra note
118, n* 1104, at 1132.
274. A. WEILL & F. TERRt, supra note 100, n* 494, at 516; 4 J. CARBONNIER, supra note
118, § 81, at 306.
275. 6 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, supra note 115, n* 436, at 587. But dominant parties
have encountered little difficulty in drafting clear and effective termination clauses.
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an express condition. French courts proved unable to avoid forfeiture
once they recognized the validity of termination clauses. A partial
solution has come from the legislature, which has closely regulated
termination clauses in a number of special statutes governing particu-
lar contract types such as insurance, commercial and residential
leases, and construction contracts. These legislative interventions, all
outside the Civil Code, protect consumers and other special groups
from one-sided termination clauses imposed by dominant parties. 276
The French courts' approval of termination clauses appears to
have a much simpler explanation which, although not ignored by
French scholars, is so basic that they do not highlight it. This expla-
nation derives from the Code's approach to contracts. The articles in
the Civil Code governing contracts are almost all subject to modifica-
tion by party agreement. They are, as the French call it, "suppletive,"
meaning they govern, where relevant, the contract between the par-
ties, but that the parties may opt out by agreeing to their own
terms. 277 The Code plainly rejects the contrary approach of Roman
law which limited consensual contracts to four predetermined types
(sale, lease, agency, and partnership). For a valid agreement, the Code
requires only consent, capacity, a definite subject matter, and a licit
cause. Within those limits, the parties' agreement has the force of law
between them subject to the limitation in article 6 that one cannot
derogate from laws involving public order or good morals by agree-
ment. Therefore, express terms supersede statutory terms unless the
latter involve public order or good morals.
The Code's affirmation of freedom of contract provides the best
explanation for the unanimous and unquestioning judicial approval of
termination clauses. Two cases from the 1860s, still cited today, illus-
trate the courts' treatment of the basic principle that the parties have
complete freedom to contract subject only to the public order
limitation.
The first case involved a twelve-year commercial lease with a
clause authorizing the lessor to terminate upon nonpayment of any
month's rent. 278 The lessee, who operated a boutique, missed a
monthly payment at the end of the lease's third year. The lessor in-
voked the clause, which gave the lessee an additional month's grace
276. For the fullest survey of these special statutes, see 2 B. STARCK, DROIT CIVIL OBLI-
GATIONS; CONTRAT ET QUASI-CONTRAT nn** 1620-1624, at 561-62 (1986).
277. R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 83-92
(1972).
278. Cass. civ., 2 July 1860, 1860 D. Jur. I 284.
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period to pay before the termination became effective. The lessee did
not pay during that period, and the lessor sued to regain possession of
the premises. At that point, the lessee offered to pay the rent due, and
the Paris Court of Appeals (the second-level trial court) invoked arti-
cle 1244 as a basis for allowing the delayed payment. That article,
one of the debtor relief provisions of the Code, authorized the courts
to allow hard-pressed debtors up to two additional years to perform.
The lessor challenged the Court of Appeals' judgment in the Court of
Cassation, which quashed it for violating (among other articles) arti-
cle 1134. The Court reasoned that the parties could agree that a spec-
ified delay in performance was a terminating condition which allowed
the aggrieved party to terminate upon its occurrence. There was
nothing illicit about such an agreement, which "had the force of law
for those who make it." The Court cited the provisions in articles
1184 and 1244, which allowed courts to grant debtors additional time
to perform, but plainly treated those provisions as suppletive ones
that the parties had opted out of by express agreement.
The second case denied effect to a clause in a lease which barred
a tenant from seeking termination of the lease if the lessor breached
its duty to maintain the leased premises in a habitable state. 279 With-
out expressly invoking article 6, the Court found that the clause was a
nullity because it was in manifest opposition to the essential rules gov-
erning lease contracts. This decision, according to one of the leading
contemporary treatises, recognizes that the statutory right to seek ter-
mination for grave breaches is a matter of public order which the par-
ties cannot agree to reject at the time of contracting. 280 If such
agreements were valid, a party in total breach could enforce the other
party's performance. Such a result would "disequilibrize" the bilateral
contract and deprive it of all efficacy. The parties, by agreement, may
define what constitutes a breach, and what breaches are grave enough
to warrant termination, but they cannot by agreement change the law
of remedies. The remedies available for breach are largely a matter of
public order not subject to modification by the parties. 28'
279. Cass. req., 1 Jan. 1863, 1863 S. Jur. 1 185.
280. 3 MAZEAUD, supra note 239, n ° 1012, at 351.
281. Another treatise argues that a contractant should be able to agree to seek only dam-
ages if the other party breaches (i.e., to perform regardless of any breach). A. WEILL & F.
TERRt, supra note 100, n° 493, at 515. This position seems more consistent with the common-
law practice that parties may make their promises independent of one another if they do so
clearly.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This comparative study on the effect of breach on the aggrieved
party's performance obligations prompts a number of observations,
applicable to this, and perhaps other, areas of the law. First, there is a
surprising similarity between the common law and French law. Both
systems recognize the importance of preserving contractual equilib-
rium in bilateral relationships. That recognition leads both systems to
treat promises as dependent whenever possible, thus allowing an ag-
grieved party to preserve the benefit of its own performance. Both
systems also distinguish between an aggrieved party's suspension of
performance and its termination of the contract, but neither has been
particularly successful in defining which breaches permit a party to
invoke these defensive measures. Trivial breaches plainly do not qual-
ify, but only permit the aggrieved party to sue for damages. The ques-
tion of which breaches are trivial and which are sufficiently serious is
left to a case-by-case determination. The most striking difference be-
tween the two systems is the greater scope of the aggrieved party's
restitutionary remedy in France. This difference may be attributed, at
least in part, to French law's treatment of that remedy as providing a
type of security interest analogous to the security interests in goods
which parties can create at common law if they so agree.
Second, the predominant lawmaking role in both systems has
been shared by judges and scholars. Judges first announce the law in
the course of deciding cases, and scholars subsequently bring some
order to the judges' work product. The role of the legislature, at least
until recently, has been minimal. In England and America, there was
very little private-law legislative activity until the twentieth century,
and the principal legislative contribution of the twentieth century (the
Uniform Commercial Code) leaves many of the harder questions to
the judges for case-by-case determinations. In France, the major leg-
islative initiative of 1804 actually did no more than codify, as general
principles, solutions already achieved by pre-revolutionary jurists.
Only recently has the French Parliament intervened in a more regula-
tory fashion, as it has when enacting detailed legislation governing
termination clauses for particular contract types.
Third, present law in both systems is the product of a long histor-
ical development which can only be understood in light of that his-
tory. Rules formulated in the past, sometimes under quite different
conditions, have often weighed heavily on future developments. Nev-
ertheless, the law evolved over time to accommodate new conditions.
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The consensus in both systems seems to be that, over time, the judges
have worked things out pretty well and that, as a result of their ef-
forts, the law is in a more satisfactory state today than in the past.
This upbeat spirit pervades the French treatises, which generally ap-
plaud what the French judges have done to preserve the equilibrium
between the parties to a bilateral contract. Recent judicial innova-tions in England, such as the UuciLlue u ,raecii aar. A :,-
eral termination, have also been welcomed as improvements in the
law of remedies. In America, the much acclaimed Restatements now
spur the law's evolution by generalizing the better judge-made rules.
Fourth, the experience of both systems demonstrates that issues
of contract performance most often arise in suits brought by the party
in breach. That party has a strong incentive to sue if it has performed
in part without receiving payment under the contract. The aggrieved
party who has not received a promised performance, and who also has
not performed has less incentive to sue because it only faces the loss of
the bargain and not the loss of its performance. Therefore, it is un-
realistic to state as a general rule that the innocent party must take
the initiative to sue for a discharge. The drafters of the Civil Code
unwisely fixed such a rule in the text of article 1184, but the judges,
faced with the realities of life presented to them in the form of actual
cases, have defused that rule through interpretation. The drafters of
the Restatements and of the Uniform Commercial Code have avoided
fixed rules, such as that found in article 1184, as to what are the per-
missible responses to breach. Their approach gives the parties little
guidance, at least from the text, on what is permissible, but that un-
certainty is probably inevitable. Such uncertainty is surely preferable
to article 1184's proposed solution which requires judicial termination
or to the "cure," sometimes recognized by the common law, which
allows the parties to include in their contract express conditions of
performance to be enforced strictly by the courts to achieve forfeiture.
These observations all emphasize the similarities between the
French and common-law systems. That they are similar should not
be too surprising. Political, economic and social conditions in France,
England and America are broadly similar, and have been so for sev-
eral centuries. Should not one expect the private law rules generated
by these three countries to be similar on such a basic matter as main-
taining equilibrium between the parties in a bilateral contract? Natu-
rally, each system has its own origins, its own procedures, and its own
formulations for the operative rules. Each system works out its re-
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sponse to a legal problem in ways that may seem mysterious to outsid-
ers, and studying in detail those responses may tell us a good deal
about how different systems function. But should not the results actu-
ally achieved tend to converge? One would think so, and this compar-
ative study of one area of contract law provides at least some support
for that generalization.

